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INTRODUCTION
Many corporate and criminal defense lawyers object to the attor-
ney reporting provisions in the 2003 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,2 the money-
t Dale E. Bennett Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University.
I Michael Chertoff, Remarks at the 17th Annual National Institute on White Collar
Crime 2003 (Mar. 6, 2003), quoted inJohn Gibeaut, Junior C-Men, 89 A.B.A.J.,June 2003, at
46, 48.
2 See Ira H. Raphaelson et al., Legislate in Haste, Repent and Probe at Leisure, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 10, 2003, at A27 (discussing dilemmas posed by attorney reporting and other provi-
sions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), and the
SEC rulemaking that followed).
REFORMING CORPORATIONS
laundering provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act,3 and the U.S. De-
partment of Justice's revised guidelines for the prosecution of corpo-
rations,4 as well as the Justice Department's push for even longer
sentences for financial crimes.5 Commentators have characterized
the combination of these efforts as "anti-business" and "anti-corpo-
rate."'6 Yet the premise that underlies these reform efforts is that the
federal government should transform corporations into "good citi-
zens."7 Virtually no one representing corporate America has ques-
tioned that premise. Understandably, corporations are reluctant to
declare that they do not want to be "good citizens." Nevertheless, it is
imperative to question the authority of the federal government-
through the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the Justice Department,
and other federal agencies, individually and collectively-to reform
corporations.
Assuming arguendo that corporations need reforming, this task is
a matter of corporate governance, an area that state corporate law
controls. Unlike civil law, all federal criminal law is statutory,8 and
unlike state courts, federal courts cannot exercise common law crimi-
nal jurisdiction. 9 Congress must base federal criminal laws on one or
more of its enumerated powers. 10 Congress has used the Commerce
Clause'1 to vastly increase the number of federal crimes. 12 As the Su-
3 See id. at A28; Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 48.
4 See Alan Vinegrad, Government Likely to Go After Corporations, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10,
2003, at A28; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads
of Department Components, U.S. Attorneys 1 (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
cftf/business-organizations.pdf (providing the Justice Department's principles of federal
prosecution of business organizations) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum]
5 See Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, Courts Not Soft on Fraud, Theft Crimes, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 10, 2003, at A27 (citing Letter from Justice Department, to Diana E. Murphy, chair-
woman, U.S. Sentencing Commission (Oct. 1, 2002) (advocating that the guidelines make
"prison time... the rule, not the exception, for those who violate the law in the course of
doing business")); Sue Reisinger, Government Seeks Tougher Sentences, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10,
2003, at A20.
6 See Raphaelson et al., supra note 2, at A28.
7 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHEN-
ING THE "GooD CITIZEN" CORPORATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1995) (addressing organizational sentencing
guidelines' "carrot and stick" incentives and other changes that encourage businesses to
develop strong compliance programs and crime-controlling measures) [hereinafter THE
GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION].
8 See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) (holding that power to define
crimes and punishments "resides wholly with the Congress").
9 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
10 See, e.g., Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (W.D. La. 1994) ("[A]
Congressional enactment is constitutionally proper only if it is enacted pursuant to an
enumerated power granted Congress in the Constitution.").
11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12 See TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION,
AM. BAR ASS'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 10 n.1 1 (1998) [hereinafter FEDERAL-
IZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw].
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preme Court has recendy stressed, merely invoking interstate com-
merce is not necessarily constitutionally sufficient to justify every
federal crime.1 3 Otherwise, the federal government would be exercis-
ing a general police power, which the Constitution withholds. 14
Despite its breadth, federal criminal law does not address corpo-
rate reform. So how has federal law enforcement gotten into the busi-
ness of corporate governance? Federal prosecutors might deny that
they are involved in corporate governance and assert that they are
reforming only those corporations that have committed crimes.
Pretermitting the problem that corporate guilt is entirely fictional, 15
the first point one must consider is the fact that the Justice Depart-
ment prosecutes very few of the many federal crimes committed.' 6
Given the enormous number of federal crimes and the limited num-
ber of federal judges, the Justice Department can bring only a rela-
tively small number of criminal cases.' 7 So the Department is highly
selective. The Department therefore emphasizes certain priorities,
which for a long time have included "white-collar" crime. In choosing
whether to prosecute particular corporations, prosecutors exercise a
great deal of discretion,' 8 and they consider, among other factors, the
effect prosecutions will have on other corporations. 19
Second, even though federal criminal laws do not address corpo-
rate reform, Congress's delegation of power in criminal matters, as in
other matters, has allowed executive and independent agencies to im-
plement policies that Congress might never approve if it actually voted
Depending on how all this subdivisible and dispersed law is counted, the
true number of federal crimes multiplies. While a figure of "approximately
3,000 federal crimes" is frequently cited, that helpful estimate is now surely
outdated by the large number of new federal crimes enacted in the 16 years
or so intervening since its estimation. Especially considering both statutory
and administrative regulations, the present number of federal crimes is un-
questionably larger.
Id.
13 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
14 See Romero, 883 F. Supp. at 1081.
15 See John S. BakerJr., Corporations Aren't Criminals, WALL ST.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at A18.
16 See FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 12, at 19-20.
17 See id. at 35-39.
18 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4 ("In making a decision to charge a
corporation, the prosecutor generally has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how,
and even whether to prosecute for violations of Federal criminal law.").
19 See id. at 1.
[P]rosecutors should be aware of the important public benefits that may
flow from indicting a corporation in appropriate cases. For instance, corpo-
rations are likely to take immediate remedial steps when one is indicted for
criminal conduct that is pervasive throughout a particular industry, and




on them. Congress's habit of drafting broad statutes, leaving much
interpretation to the Justice Department and federal courts, has given
federal criminal law an uncertain and expansive character.2 0 Most im-
portantly, the Supreme Court's decision in Mistretta v. United States,2'
rejecting separation-of-powers challenges to Congress's creation of
the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch and the con-
ferral on it of legislative authority over sentencing,22 made it possible
to reform "corporate culture" through actual and threatened
prosecution.
This Article proceeds, in Part I, to discuss the role that corporate
"self-policing" plays in the Justice Department's guidelines for prose-
cution. Although self-policing was initially a voluntary movement
among certain industries that worked closely with federal agencies,
the Justice Department has increasingly been forcing corporations to
self-police through the threat of federal prosecution. Part L.A dis-
cusses the "carrot and stick" approach toward inducing self-policing in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, and Part I.B ad-
dresses the Justice Department's self-reporting expectations.
This Article then addresses, in Part II, the manner in which gov-
ernment prosecution of so-called "white collar crime"23 creates stigma
and presumptions of guilt among alleged corporate criminals. In-
deed, as Part II.B discusses, the wars on terrorism and organized
crime may implicitly place corporate criminals in the same category as
mobsters and terrorists.
I
SELF-POLICING: FROM PRIVATE, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES TO
CRIMINALLY ENFORCEABLE MINIMUM STANDARDS
Corporate self-policing began voluntarily in the private sector.2 4
The U.S. Sentencing Commission then incorporated the idea into the
federal sentencing guidelines for organizations. 25 Self-policing be-
20 Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 761 (1999) ("Congress has eschewed legislative specific-
ity . . . [and] transfer[red] a considerable degree of lawmaking authority to the other
branches of government.")
21 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
22 See id. at 384-85. The Court also rejected a constitutional challenge based on ex-
cessive delegation. See id. at 378-79.
23 See text accompanying notes 212, 228-31 (challenging the validity of the term
'white collar crime").
24 See Hon. Eleanor Hill, Coordinating Enforcement Under the Defense Department's Volun-
tary Disclosure Program, in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra note 7, at 267, 269; Alan
R. Yuspeh, The Defense Industry Initiative (DII): Lessons Learned (Sept. 7, 1995), in THE GOOD
CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra note 7, at 83.
25 See Win Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines' "Carrot and Stick" Philosophy, and
Their Focus on "Effective" Compliance (Sept. 7, 1995), in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION,
supra note 7, at 29.
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came a tool that some administrative agencies used as part of pro-
grams of leniency. Finally, it has become virtually mandatory as far as
the Justice Department and some other federal agencies are con-
cerned. 26 Over the course of almost two decades, self-policing
through compliance programs has been reshaping the private sector.
By using the broad term "wrongdoing, '27 which can cover noncrimi-
nal conduct such as the failure to "meet[ ] industry standards and best
practices,"2 8 the Justice Department has expanded its mission beyond
criminal law enforcement to "enable[ ] the government to . . . be a
force for positive change of corporate culture. '29
Initially, self-policing or compliance programs were voluntarily
adopted in industries closely tied to the federal government. For ex-
ample, after a bribing scandal in the defense industry,30 seventeen de-
fense contractors came together in 1986 to create a document called
"The Defense Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct"
(DII).31 This self-policing initiative was an outgrowth of recommenda-
tions of the Packard Commission (chaired by the founder of Hewlett-
Packard Corporation and then Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard) that called for the defense industry to adopt codes of con-
duct, ethics training, and compliance-related procedures. 32 When the
U.S. Department of Defense later began its own voluntary disclosure
program, the Department acknowledged that the program was
voluntary. 33
26 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1. Thompson refers to the advance
of the Corporate Fraud Task Force's "mission" and its revision of principles for federal
prosecution of business organizations. Further, he mentions the voluntary disclosure pro-
grams of the SEC and the EPA. Id. at 5.
27 See id. at 1.
28 Id. at 15. The Justice Department discussed such forms of wrongdoing in the con-
text of corporate rehabilitation:
Rehabilitation, of course, requires that the corporation undertake to be
law-abiding in the future. It is, therefore, appropriate to require the corpo-
ration, as a condition of probation, to implement a compliance program or
to reform an existing one. As discussed above, prosecutors may consult
with the appropriate state and federal agencies and components of the Jus-
tice Department to ensure that a proposed compliance program is ade-
quate and meets industry standards and best practices.
Id.
29 Id. at 1.
30 See Andy Pasztor, Lockheed Martin Settles Influence Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1996, at
10.
31 See Yuspeh, supra note 24, at 83-87.
32 See id. at 83.
33 See id. at 84; see also Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & Stephanie R. Pratt, An Offer You Can't
Refuse?, Bus. CRIMES BULL., June 2003, at 1, 6 ("[Tlhe [Defense Department] expressly
stated that the purpose of its voluntary disclosure policy was 'to encourage voluntary disclo-
sure without legally or contractually mandating [it] .'") (emphasis added) (third alteration in




Since then, government agencies, rather than individuals in the
private sector, have driven such programs and have applied these pro-
grams to groups beyond those, like defense contractors, who sell di-
rectly to the government. For instance, as the Medicare program has
expanded, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) has become the largest "purchaser" of health care. 34 The fed-
eral government does not purchase health care directly the way it
purchases aircraft; rather, it reimburses health care recipients in a
manner similar (for present purposes) to an insurance company.35 In
terms of fraud and abuse, however, HHS operates as if there is no
difference. Unlike the Defense Department's original view that pri-
vate companies engaged in self-policing were doing so voluntarily, the
federal government approach is typified by the unfounded HHS asser-
tion that self-policing in the form of a "compliance program" is a "le-
gal duty."36 To assist federal agencies in fighting "fraud and abuse,"
Congress created inspectors general that audit compliance with agen-
cies' rules.37 Thus, federal agencies' auditing powers, which are legiti-
mate to oversee spending within federal agencies and by nonprofit
grantees on federally funded projects, have extended into the private
sector of for-profit businesses and professions that sell to or receive
reimbursement from the federal government.
As states learned long ago, the federal government uses its ability
to make grants under its spending power to change the recipient's
behavior. 38 Even when this is not the original intent, most grants
eventually do have this effect. Defense contractors, which depend
heavily on the Defense Department, are unavoidably and voluntarily
subject to their powerful purchaser.39 Indeed, the nature of that rela-
tionship is what gave rise to the pejorative term, "the military indus-
34 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Cri-
tique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 778, 817 & n.165 (1986).
35 See, e.g., RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, PUBLIC FINANCE: GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND Ex-
PENDITURES IN THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 394-95 (forthcoming 2005), at http://garnet.
acns.fsu.edu/%7Eholcombe/chap2l.PDF (discussing the federally-funded Medicare and
Medicaid programs).
36 See Publication of the OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399,
58,400 (Oct. 30, 1998). ("The [Office of Inspector General] believes that . . . [corpora-
tions] have an ethical and legal duty ... [that] includes an obligation to take measures,
such as instituting a compliance program, to detect and prevent fraudulent, abusive, and
wasteful activities.").
37 See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 2, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2 (2000).
38 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that "[i]ncident
to [its spending] power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds,
and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further broad policy objectives by conditioning
receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and
administrative directives'" (citations omitted)).
39 See Marina Lao, Mergers in a Declining Defense Industry: Should the Merger Guidelines Be
Reassessed?, 28 CONN. L. REv. 347, 387-88 (1996) (discussing relationship between the De-
fense Department and its exclusive suppliers).
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trial complex." Health care, however, is an entirely different industry.
Until relatively recently, it has not been an "industry" at all, but a
widely dispersed collection of doctors, hospitals, and other agencies. 40
As Medicare spending has grown, however, health care has been con-
solidating into an "industry" of fewer and larger providers under the
pressures of federal spending and regulation. 41 Thus, even though
health care differs fundamentally from the defense industry, federal
purchasing power explains how federal agencies are able to reshape
certain industries within the private sector.
Most of the private sector is not directly dependent on govern-
ment spending. Nevertheless, the Justice Department and other fed-
eral agencies are attempting to make virtually all corporations, as
"good citizens," adopt corporate compliance programs. The "incen-
tive" for doing so is the not-so-subtle threat of federal prosecution.
Thus, federal agencies have assumed unto themselves the power to
regulate much of corporate and professional America that neither
sells to nor receives reimbursement from the federal government.
A. "Carrots and Sticks" in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations
Corporate self-policing or compliance plans have become perva-
sive since the 1991 adoption of the guidelines for sentencing of orga-
nizations. 42 The Sentencing Guidelines have spawned a "compliance"
industry of lawyers, accountants, consultants, and corporate vice presi-
dents, who draft codes of corporate conduct and provide employee
training in both the codes and appropriate practices-which, in turn,
they audit for compliance. 43 When violations occur, theoretically the
system of compliance should detect them and the corporation should
"voluntarily" disclose the wrongdoing to federal law enforcement. Al-
though the Sentencing Guidelines do not offer much guidance, the
voluntarily adopted codes of conduct are supposed to be "effective
40 See generally Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Changes, Consolidation and Com-
petition in Health Care Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1999, at 141 (1999) (discussing the
transformation of U.S. health care).
41 Id.
42 Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 56 Fed. Reg.
22,762, 22,786-97 (May 16, 1991).
43 See, e.g., Edward A. Dauer, The NCPL Commission on Corporate Compliance Guidelines
(Sept. 7, 1995), in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra note 7, at 195 (describing how
the National Center for Preventive Law, which offers training in corporate compliance
systems and consists of "private lawyers, general counsel of corporations, some legal educa-
tors, public interest organizations, and a variety of other people, including some non-law-




program [s],"4 which seems to imply that their operation will result in
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing.
According to the Sentencing Commission, the Guidelines adopt a
"carrot and stick" approach.4 5 The "carrot" of a potentially lesser sen-
tence upon future conviction is supposedly the incentive for a corpo-
ration to adopt a code of conduct and voluntarily disclose
wrongdoing. 46 If a convicted corporation has not pursued these in-
centives, the "stick" will be the imposition of higher penalties.4 7
The so-called "carrot and stick" approach never had much carrot
to it, however. If a company adopted a compliance program and self-
reported violations, it received no guarantee of leniency.48 On the
other hand, the failure to pursue the carrot "voluntarily" virtually
guaranteed being hit with the stick in the event of a corporate convic-
tion.49 As the Senior Attorney at what was then Bell Atlantic put it:
We've all heard the sentencing guidelines described as using the
carrot and stick. The idea is to reward good acts and to punish the
bad. But, in fact, we may be somewhat off the mark. Companies
today that take aggressive ethics and compliance steps run high risks
of being beaten with their own acts, beaten with the carrots that
were supposed to lure them to do good things. Moreover, what is
offered as a reward may not really be a carrot. Instead of offering
real incentives, for the most part we are only shortening the stick
that will be used against companies. 50
In terms of sentencing, the so-called incentives are burdens on
corporations without corresponding benefits. The benefit, as the Sen-
tencing Commission sees it, is that self-policing assists corporations to
become "good citizens. '5 1 However desirable this goal may be, it is
quite possible to be less than a good citizen without committing a
crime. Many individuals are less than "good citizens" by society's stan-
dards because they do not vote, volunteer for military service, or oth-
44 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2002).
45 See Swenson, supra note 25, at 29.
46 See id. at 33.
47 See id.
48 The organizational guidelines provide for reduction of culpability for organizations
that maintain compliance programs or self-report violations, but it is ultimately up to the
court to determine whether programs are effective or whether self-reporting occurred
"within a reasonably prompt time" or was "fully" cooperative. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 5C2.5(f), (g).
49 SeeJoseph E. Murphy, Beating Them With Carrots and Feeding Them Sticks (Sept. 8,
1995), in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra note 7, at 391.
50 Id,
51 See L. Russell Burress, How the Organizational Guidelines Work: An Overview (Sept. 7,
1995), in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra note 7, at 9 ("The Sentencing Commis-
sion believes that an organization that has developed and has maintained an effective com-
pliance program ... is a good corporate citizen .... [T] here are a number of benefits to
being a good corporate citizen.").
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erwise act with civic virtue. Unlike in other countries, 52 however,
these omissions indicative of poor citizenship have not been treated as
criminal in the United States.
Corporations, of course, cannot vote or volunteer for the military;
so should they be treated differently? Indeed, corporations can do
none of the actions required of a virtuous citizen because, as abstract
entities, they lack the mind and will necessary to make the voluntary
choices which distinguish virtue from vice and criminal conduct from
noncriminal conduct. For that reason, corporations could not be
guilty of crimes at common law.53 When the Supreme Court departed
from the common law rule in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Co. v. United States, 54 it upheld a misdemeanor conviction of a corpora-
tion and allowed punishment by a fine, which was long assumed to be
the only way courts could punish a corporation. 55
One premise of New York Central was that the law should not treat
corporations differently from individuals. 56 Thus, because corpora-
tions cannot be arrested orjailed, the Court thought that the judiciary
should at least be able to fine corporations for public wrongs. 57 The
Sentencing Commission, however, was not satisfied that fines, regard-
less of how they were calibrated, were adequate. 5 8 Apparently assum-
ing that much more undetected corporate misconduct was occurring,
it wanted something more than "[f] ines for the unlucky corporations
that were caught."59 The Commission desired to change "corporate
culture" generally,6° both for the convicted and the nonconvicted. Its
approach was quite compatible with (although not necessarily based
on) the assumption, discussed below, 61 that all corporations are pre-
sumably guilty of criminal conduct.
52 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE,
COMPULSORY VOTING, at http://www.idea.int/vt/analysis/CompulsoryVoting.cfm (last vis-
ited Oct. 26, 2003) (discussing the punishment, both criminal and civil, of failure to vote).
53 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 701-02 (4th ed. 2003).
54 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
55 See id. at 494-95.
56 See id. at 496-97.
57 See id. at 495. The Court quoted favorably from Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Common-
wealth, 52 N.E. 445, 446 (Mass. 1899), stating: "'A corporation cannot be arrested and
imprisoned in either civil or criminal proceedings, but its property may be taken either as
compensation for a private wrong or as punishment for a public wrong.'" Id. at 492. The
New York Central Court went on to state, "We see no valid objection in law, and every reason
in public policy, why the corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act
through its agents and officers, shall be held punishable by fine .... " Id. at 495.
58 See Swenson, supra note 25, at 32-33. The Commission explicitly stated its desire
for punishment more stringent than "[flines for the unlucky corporations that were
caught." Id. at 32.
59 Id.
60 See Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of
Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IowA L. REv. 697, 710-11 (2002).
61 See infra Part II.B.1.
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The so-called "carrot" approach turned the organizational guide-
lines into an aspirational and admittedly experimental 62 exercise in
"integrity" education for corporations. 63 As a private undertaking by
corporations themselves, an "integrity" approach to corporate man-
agement has many benefits. 64 As a matter of punishment, after a cor-
poration has been convicted or pled guilty, developing an "integrity"
plan may well be a legitimate condition of probation. But how is it
legitimate for the guidelines to tell corporations, before there is any
indication of wrongdoing on their part, that they will be punished
more severely if they do not adopt a corporate "integrity" program?
Corporations should not be "subject to harsher treatment" than
others, at least according to Justice Department guidelines. 65 Cer-
tainly, all persons are equally responsible for their own conduct and
therefore are expected to "police" themselves. Indeed, the mark of a
self-governing republic is that citizens govern themselves. Neverthe-
less, except for juveniles whom the state can convict for "status of-
fenses" 66 (such as truancy, which applies to offenders because of their
status as juveniles), individuals are free to act as they choose as long as
they do not violate a clear criminal prohibition. Accordingly, va-
grancy laws that do not clearly define what is criminally proscribed are
unconstitutionally vague because such laws do not provide adequate
62 See Mary E. Didier, Introduction: Reading Compliance Criteria into the Guidelines: Integ-
rity-Centered vs. Law-Centered Programs (Sept. 7, 1995), in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION,
supra note 7, at 219 ("[T]he definition of an effective compliance program should be
viewed as somewhat 'elastic'-in other words, able to accommodate a range of compliance
approaches with the ultimate focus of the definition being to encourage companies to
devise programs that actually work.").
63 Professor [Lynn Sharp] Paine describes the legal compliance model as be-
ing lawyer-driven, unduly focused on the narrow objective of avoiding crim-
inal violations, and too reliant on threats and punishments to achieve its
law-related objective. This model contrasts with an integrity-based ap-
proach to ethics management which, she states, combines a concern for the
law with an emphasis on managerial responsibility for ethical behavior....
[I]f, as Professor Paine argues, the integrity-based approach is more effec-
tive in bringing about lawful conduct, there is every reason to believe that
the guidelines would embrace such an approach.
Id. at 220.
64 See generally Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 106, 111-17 (discussing how ethical guidelines help corporations
achieve customer satisfaction and avoid legal problems).
65 Under the "General Principle" heading, both the Thompson Memorandum, supra
note 4, at 1, and its predecessor, Memorandum from Eric Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney
General, to Heads of Department Components and All United States Attorneys (June 16,
1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/6161999.htm and http://www.usdoj.
gov/04foia/readingrooms/6161999a.htm [hereinafter Holder Memorandum], begin with
the statement: "Corporations should not be treated leniently because of their artificial na-
ture nor should they be subject to harsher treatment."
66 See BLACK'S Law DICrIONARY 1110 (7th ed. 1999) (defining status offense as "[a]
minor's violation of the juvenile code by doing some act that would not be considered
illegal if an adult did it ... ).
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notice to affected persons and because their uncertainty leaves too
much discretion to government law enforcement. 67 The organiza-
tional guidelines, however, allow for increased punishment for failing
to take "good citizen" actions6 8-actions that the government does
not require of individuals and that are not clearly defined.
While individuals are only required to comply with the law, cor-
porations must adopt "an integrity strategy [that] is broader, deeper,
and more demanding than a legal compliance initiative. "69 Not only
does the Justice Department hold corporations to a different stan-
dard, but the Department has failed to define the requirements for
being a "good citizen," which raises serious notice problems. 70 How
does a corporation satisfy a standard that is qualitative? The guidelines
conflate prescription with proscription. Reasonable persons can disa-
gree about matters of prescription, such as an exhortation to be a
"good" person or a "good" citizen. In a country that values liberty, it is
problematic to expect much agreement among citizens who have dif-
ferent views of what it means to be "good." It is, therefore, all the
more important that there be clear notice of proscribed conduct;
criminal prohibitions serve this purpose.7 1 Although some of these
statutes may assume underlying moral norms,72 they do not prescribe
virtuous conduct. The guidelines' mixture of prescriptive and pro-
scriptive puts law-abiding corporations at risk. As the President of the
National Center for Preventative Law, which has been offering corpo-
rate compliance training since 1985, told the Commission: "The U.S.
67 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (finding a va-
grancy ordinance void for vagueness because it "'fail [ed] to give a person of ordinary intel-
ligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,'" (citation
omitted) and it "encourage[d] arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," id. at 156).
68 See Swenson, supra note 25, at 33.
Mandatory guidelines can create incentives-Finally, the Commission recog-
nized that because guideline penalties are essentially mandatory and there-
fore predictable, penalties tied to how well a corporate defendant had
undertaken specified crime-controlling actions would create incentives for
companies to take those actions. With a guideline system, corporate manag-
ers would know--unlike the situation in the pre-guideline era-that their
"good citizen" actions would make a difference in terms of the company's
exposure to penalties. Good citizen actions, low penalties. Failure to take
such actions, high penalties-"carrot and stick."
Id.
69 Paine, supra note 64, at 111.
70 See Dauer, supra note 43, at 197 ("A government is . . .supposed to hold people
liable for acts only when it warns them, with specificity, in advance.... [I]t doesn't pass
constitutional muster if it's not quite specific enough to tell you what it is you're supposed
to do or refrain from doing.").
71 Cf 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 2.3, at
126-35 (1986) (discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
72 This depends on whether the prohibition applies to what has been traditionally
referred to as a malum in se or malum prohibitum offense. SeeJEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 338 & n.50 (2d ed. 1960).
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Sentencing Commission's guidelines have taken the style of the com-
mon law of negligence and engrafted it on top of the liability of the
criminal process. In fact, it's a misfit."73
If a corporation does in fact implement an effective compliance
program, the corporation is probably not even negligent, much less
guilty of crime. Under such circumstances, as the recently resigned
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson wrote while working as a
defense attorney, "[t]he organization is in effect blameless. ' 74 When
an individual is blameless, it is unethical to prosecute him; apparently
a different standard applies to "blameless" corporations. Even accord-
ing to Senator Edward Kennedy, who pushed for organizational sen-
tencing, the government should guarantee that a corporation will not
be indicted where it has in good faith instituted a compliance pro-
gram.75 With such a program in place, any violations of the law by a
corporation, as Thompson argued in his prior role, 76 constitute no
more than negligence. Despite such obvious considerations of fair-
ness, corporations remain at the mercy of sentencing judges and pros-
ecutors who decide whether the programs are "effective."
So how does a corporation determine whether it has an "effec-
tive" compliance program without simply hoping that a prosecutor or
sentencing judge will believe it does? If indicted, a corporation can
put its case to a jury by arguing that it had a compliance policy in
place and that the employee who violated the law acted contrarily to
that policy.77 Not wishing to risk leaving their fate to a jury, many
corporations have created a new position of "ethics and compliance
officer."78  Still, by what standard does such an officer determine
whether a corporation's policies will prevent it from being indicted?
Apparently, this is an uncertain and evolving standard.79 Thus, the
73 Dauer, supra note 43, at 195, 197.
74 Larry D. Thompson, Fairness in White Collar Crime Cases: Prosecutors Should Faithfully
Follow the Principles of Federal Prosecution, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, June 19, 1992, at 2, available
at www.lexis.com, News Library, Washington Legal Foundation File (last visited Oct. 26,
2003) [hereinafter Fairness].
75 See Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Keynote Address (Sept. 7, 1995), in THE GOOD CITI-
ZEN COR'ORATION, supra note 7, at 120 ("In effect, the guidelines make a basic promise to
companies: 'Act as good citizens and your penalty exposure will be reduced.' But that
promise is false if companies face non-guideline penalties that take no account of these
'good citizenship' efforts.").
76 See Fairness, supra note 74, at 2.
77 See United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[A] corporation
may be liable for acts of its employees done contrary to express instructions and policies,
but. . . the existence of such instructions and policies may be considered in determining
whether the employee in fact acted to benefit the corporation.").
78 See Murphy, supra note 60, at 710 ("The organizational guidelines have been
credited with helping to create an entirely newjob description: the Ethics and Compliance
Officer. Such officers develop and manage an organization's ethics and compliance
programs.").
79 See Dauer, supra note 43, at 196.
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standard may or may not now include the "ethics" of a corporation, a
term mentioned nowhere in the guidelines. An ethics requirement
may well be read in. Consider what Sentencing Commission Chair
Judge Diana E. Murphy has written on the relationship between ethics
and effectiveness:
Although the term "ethics" does not occur anywhere within the
organizational guidelines, opinions differ regarding whether ethical
considerations always have been an implicit component of effective
compliance programs, or whether ethics should now explicitly be
incorporated into the compliance program criteria in the organiza-
tional guidelines. Dr. Stephen Cohen of the University of New
South Wales calls ethics the next step: "We are now at a point where
a further step is recognised for compliance; and that step is 'ethics'.
This is now clearly part of the brief of compliance departments.
And, as with the earlier evolution, the inclusion of ethics requires articu-
lation and then expertise."
Compliance is more than looking to the letter of the law: "It is a
management function that calls for skill and diligence in managing
the ways in which a business conducts its daily affairs." It should
incorporate "policy development, communications .... [assessment
of] vulnerabilities," as well as the success of ethics programs....
It is questionable whether a compliance program can be truly effective if
it does not have an ethics component.80
It is generally accepted that using criminal law to bring about moral
reform or rehabilitation among individuals has been a failure.8'
There is, however, absolutely no basis at all for attempting to achieve
moral reform or rehabilitation of a corporation. A corporation can-
not "sin" and has "no soul to damn," and it operates through any
number of individuals, which makes any attempt at reform or rehabili-
tation of the individuals involved even more problematic. 82 Truly, the
attempt to reform (before indictment) or rehabilitate (after convic-
tion) corporations is "A Novel Sentencing Approach."8 3 This "novel"
approach is particularly dubious given that the legislation creating the
Sentencing Commission and delegating the task of developing sen-
tencing guidelines discounts the role of rehabilitation in favor of just
punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.8 4 What is truly "novel" is
80 Murphy, supra note 60, at 714-16 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (em-
phasis added).
81 SeeJAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 169 (1975).
82 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 386, 397-99 (1981).
83 See Murphy, supra note 60, at 702.
84 See Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Cor-
porations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future,
71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 207 (1993); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2000) ("[Imprisonment is
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that in the name of moral and ethical reform and rehabilitation, the
Sentencing Commission has, without clear statutory authority, arro-
gated the power to regulate corporate governance. The message that
the guidelines send to all corporate officers and directors amounts to
a mandate that they govern their corporations in a manner that is
acceptable to prosecutors and juries; otherwise judges will be required
to "rehabilitate" convicted corporations.8 5
What gives the Sentencing Commission authority to treat corpo-
rations so differently from individuals? Again, setting aside the ques-
tionable moral legitimacy of prosecuting corporations, 86 the fact that
corporations cannot be jailed means that some differences in punish-
ment are necessary. The unprecedented federal intrusion into the
regulation of corporate governance, however, is constitutionally ques-
tionable. 87 At the very least, there should be plain statutory authority
for such an intrusion. Initially, the Sentencing Commission was un-
clear as to its authority over organizational sentencing.8 8 As impor-
tant as this question was the fact that "the Commission never formally
not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation."). The Chair of the
Sentencing Commission justifies the organizational guidelines as follows:
The guidelines for individuals, according to some commentators, focus on
punishment and incapacitation .... Conversely, the organizational guide-
lines focus on providing restitution and an appropriate fine range for the
offender organization through far reaching probation provisions. Perhaps
more importantly, however, these guidelines are geared toward deterrence,
and they provide sentencing benefits for organizations that have an "effec-
tive program to prevent and detect violations of law."
Murphy, supra note 60, at 702-03 (footnotes omitted) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(k) (2001)).
85 See Murphy, supra note 60, at 703.
The organizational guidelines give organizations an incentive to have in
place an effective compliance program. They not only encourage corpora-
tions to exemplify "good corporate citizenship," but also provide a means to
"rehabilitate" corporations that have engaged in criminal conduct by re-
quiring them, as a term of probation, to institute and maintain effective
compliance programs.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Swenson, supra note 25, at 34-35).
86 See Baker, supra note 15, at A18.
87 In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-22 (1819), the Supreme
Court upheld Congress's creation of a corporation, namely, the Bank of the United States,
as an exercise of implied powers from several enumerated powers, as well as from the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Nevertheless, the creation of private corporations remains a
matter of state law. See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding
that Congress may not "regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 559-63 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not grant Congress authority
to enact a criminal statute regulating guns in local school zones without a showing that
such guns affect interstate commerce or a jurisdictional provision limiting the statute's
application to those cases that affect interstate commerce).
88 See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 84, at 212 ("The Commission understood Con-
gress'[s] principal concern in establishing the Commission: unfettered judicial sentencing
discretion fostered unwarranted disparity and discrimination, and other unsatisfactory re-
sults in the sentencing of individuals." (footnote omitted)).
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determined that its enabling statute required the promulgation of orga-
nizational sentencing guidelines, [although] certain individual Com-
missioners clearly held this view."89 The Commission's decision to
promulgate these guidelines was apparently based on the notion that
the it should rectify an inequality in sentencing among corporate de-
fendants and between white-collar and non-white-collar defendants. 90
But by the time the Commission adopted the guidelines, it seemed to
have forgotten that principle of equality in treatment. This shift in
posture may be attributable to changes in the Commission's member-
ship and, therefore, in its overall philosophy. 91 Senator Ted Kennedy
also apparently exercised considerable influence over both the issue
of the Commission's authority to develop any organizational guide-
lines and its attitude towards the seriousness of the white-collar crime
problem.9 2
Undue influence by prominent members of Congress over ad-
ministrative agencies that they oversee may be an unavoidable conse-
quence of the so-called "delegation doctrine." 93 This same kind of
political influence, however, over an entity located within the Judicial
Branch-which is where Congress placed the Sentencing Commis-
sion 94-should be a matter of great concern. As for administrative
agencies, even Justice Scalia recognizes that "unconstitutional delega-
89 Id. at 213.
90 See id. at 215-17.
91 See id. at 229.
92 On the question of the Commission's authority to issue the organizational guide-
lines, an article written (in their private capacities) by a member of the Commission, Pro-
fessor Ilene Nagel, and the Commission's Deputy General Counsel and Legislative
Counsel, Winthrop Swenson, cites a question posed by Senator Kennedy in hearings held
long after passage of the legislation (without mentioning any other member of Congress)
to support the statement that "repeated formal and informal requests from members of
the Senate and House Judiciary Committees regarding the Commission's progress on, and
proposals for, organizational sanctions patently contradicted the contention that Congress
intended organizations convicted of federal crimes to be exempt from its scheme for sen-
tencing reform." Id. at 216 & n.52. The authors also refer to Senator Kennedy, and no
other member of Congress, to support the statement that the Commission "also recog-
nized that some members of Congress, and a majority of the public, perceived an unwar-
ranted disparity in the severity of sentences meted out to white collar offenders when
compared to the severity of sentences meted out to non-white collar offenders." Id. at 215
& n.50. As the keynote speaker at the Commission Conference on the "Good Citizen"
Corporation, Senator Kennedy characterized the compliance programs as "so significant"
in dealing with corporate crime at the level of "the culture and policies of a company."
Kennedy, supra note 75, at 119.
93 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated
Power, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1443, 1515-16 (discussing disproportionate influence of certain
members of Congress over agencies during agencies' implementation of statutes).
94 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1989) ("Although placed by
the Act in the Judicial Branch, it is not a court and does not exercise judicial power.
Rather, the Commission is an 'independent' body comprised of seven voting members




tion ... is not.., readily enforceable by the courts. '9 5 The Sentenc-
ing Commission, however, is not an administrative agency; it conducts
some information gathering,96 but otherwise it is solely legislative. 97
As the majority in Mistretta acknowledged, the Commission is "a pecu-
liar institution,"98 whose existence as an independent agency within
the Judicial Branch raises some concern about separation of powers.99
In the majority's view, however,
the "practical consequences" of locating the Commission within the
Judicial Branch pose no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial
Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitu-
tional bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-
legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the
courts.1 00
Once again, however, Justice Scalia has proven to be quite pre-
scient. He charged that the Sentencing Commission represents a
more serious violation of separation of powers even than the Indepen-
dent Counsel statute approved by the Court in Morrison v. Olson.10 1
He was the lone dissenter in both Mistretta and Morrison. Years later,
when Congress finally decided in 2000 not to renew the Independent
Counsel statute, many hailed Justice Scalia for accurately identifying
the dangerousness of that statute. 10 2 More recently, federal judges
have also complained about congressional and executive intrusion
into the judicial function of sentencing. 103 Although Congress has
95 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96 See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 84, at 207.
97 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted: "The law-
making function of the Sentencing Commission is completely divorced from any responsi-
bility for execution of the law or adjudication of private rights under the law." Id. at 420
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 384.
99 See id.
100 Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
101 See id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-91
(1988)). Scalia was the lone dissenter in both Mistretta and Morrison.
102 See, e.g., Richard Reeves, Let Us Praise Scalia and Condemn Starr, BUFF. NEws, Aug. 14,
1998, at B3 ("Uustice Scalia] was the only one who truly understood the dangers of the
independent counsel law when it was found to be constitutional in 1988."); James
Toedtman, Independent Counsel Law: Democrats 'Eating Humble Pie Now,'SA-rrLE TIMES, July
24, 1998, at A2 ("[Ten years ago, Justice Scalia] was fighting a losing battle against the law
creating the independent counsel. A decade later, Scalia's spirited attack on the creation
of an independent counsel is favored reading for defenders of embattled President
Clinton.").
103 See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 570 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Mandatory minimum statutes are fundamentally inconsistent with Con-
gress' simultaneous effort to create a fair, honest, and rational sentencing
system through the use of Sentencing Guidelines. Unlike Guidelines
sentences, statutory mandatory minimums generally deny the judge the le-
gal power to depart downward, no matter how unusual the special circum-
stances that call for leniency. . . . They transfer sentencing power to
prosecutors, who can determine sentences through the charges they decide
2004]
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the power to legislate very detailed sentencing provisions which would
micro-manage judges, the constitutionally designed process of bicam-
eralism and presentment make it difficult for Congress to enact con-
troversial legislation without significant compromise. The Sentencing
Commission can "legislate" more easily, with Congress intervening
when, for example, it adds mandatory minimum sentences. Justice
Scalia's point in both Morrison and Mistretta was that a "flexible" ap-
proach to the Constitution's design for separation of powers necessa-
rily produces the very kind of political abuses of power the Framers
sought to minimize.'0 4
B. Codes of Conduct: From Carrot to Stick
Since the creation of the organizational sentencing guidelines in
1991, the Justice Department has come to view self-reporting as virtu-
ally mandatory.10 5 The Department's position on the sentencing
guidelines reflects this view, in that the Department "'recommend[s]
an additional two-level enhancement when a company does not self-
report in a timely way following discovery of criminal behavior.' "106
Both before and after the Commission adopted the organiza-
tional guidelines in 1991, different federal agencies experimented
with programs which offered leniency for companies that voluntarily
reported criminal violations.' 0 7 Then in 1999, a Justice Department
to bring, and who thereby have reintroduced much of the sentencing dis-
parity that Congress created Guidelines to eliminate.... And there is evi-
dence that they encourage subterfuge, leading to more frequent downward
departures (on a random basis), thereby making them a comparatively inef-
fective means of guaranteeing tough sentences.
Id. (citations omitted).
104 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that treating separa-
tion of powers as no more than a generalized prescription violates the Founders' intent
and will have disastrous consequences).
105 See Savage & Pratt, supra note 33, at I ("The government's expectations have
evolved from a policy of encouraging self-disclosure to one that independently punishes
failure to self-disclose.").
106 Id. at 6 (quoting Public Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Advisoy Group on Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines to the U.S. Sentencing Commission 20 (Nov. 14, 2002) (testimony of U.S.
Department of Justice), http://www.ussc.gov/corp/phll-02/PLENARY2.pdf).
107 See, e.g., Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Preven-
tion of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) ("The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency today issues its final policy to enhance protection of human health and the
environment by encouraging regulated entities to discover voluntarily, disclose, correct
and prevent violations of federal environmental law."); Revision of the NRC Enforcement
Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,381, 34,393-94 (June 30, 1995) (reducing civil penalties and possi-
bly eliminating enforcement actions for self-reported crimes); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
lencorp.htm (statingJustice Department policy that leniency "will be granted to a corpora-
tion reporting illegal activity before an investigation has begun" under certain conditions);
In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31,554, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 85,067, at 83,606 (Dec. 3, 1992) ("The supervisory obligations imposed by
the federal securities laws require a vigorous response even to indications of wrongdo-
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memorandum, "Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations"
(known as the "Holder Memorandum," after then Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder), stated that compliance programs and corpora-
tion cooperation are factors that federal prosecutors should consider
when deciding whether or not to indict a corporation.'08 This memo-
randum apparently reflected the policy-shift of the Clinton Justice De-
partment in the direction of regulating entire industries by the threat
of prosecution, rather than simply punishing those proven to have
committed criminal acts.10 9 However, criminal prosecutions did not
decrease even as regulation through the threat of prosecution
increased.1I" 0
When the Bush Administration commenced in 2001, many as-
sumed that it would adopt different policies regarding prosecuting
corporations. Eric Holder's replacement, Deputy Attorney General
Larry D. Thompson, while a defense attorney, had written an article
that was critical of federal corporate prosecutions. 1 ' Following the
collapse of Enron and WorldCom, however, Thompson not only rati-
ing."); INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DOCUMENT No. IGDPH 5505.50
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE PROGRAM (1990), http://www.
dodig.osd.mil/AIM/alsd/ERR/IGPH550550.pdf (stating that Defense Department "en-
courages contractors to adopt a policy of voluntarily disclosing potential civil or criminal
fraud matters"). Incentives for self-reporting began in the mid-1970s with programs initi-
ated by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department. See Savage & Pratt, supra note 33, at 5. The Defense Department followed
with its "Voluntary Disclosure Program" in 1986. See id.
108 See Holder Memorandum, supra note 65.
109 See Robert S. Litt, The Experience and Views of the Enforcement Community (Sept. 8,
1995), in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra note 7, at 303.
In recent years, the Department of Justice has come to focus more and
more on the importance of prevention and compliance, as opposed to en-
forcement and punishment, as a means of effective law enforcement. If you
want to police an entire industry's practices, you frequently have to enlist
the industry itself in helping you. And so we are looking for ways to en-
courage corporate self-policing. By this, I mean requiring or inducing cor-
porate management to take more responsibility itself for preventing and
detecting employee misconduct. This includes implementing comprehen-
sive and effective compliance programs to prevent corporate crimes, and it
also includes voluntarily disclosing criminal activity to the government
when the company discovers it.
Id.
110 Indeed, federal convictions of organizations have remained fairly steady since the
Justice Department released the Holder Memorandum, supra note 65. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 92 (2001) (reporting 238
prosecutions of organizations resulting in fines or restitution or both); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 92 (2000) (reporting 296
prosecutions of organizations resulting in fines or restitution or both); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 92 (1999) (reporting 255
prosecutions of organizations resulting in fines or restitution or both).
III See Fairness, supra note 74, at 2.
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fled but expanded the policies of the Clinton Justice Department with
respect to corporate prosecutions.' 1 2
Under the Bush Administration, federal agencies now view codes
of conduct, compliance programs, and self-reporting as legal duties.
According to the Inspector General of HHS, self-reporting is "an ethi-
cal and legal duty." 113 Self-reporting, however, extends beyond crimi-
nal conduct to "immediate notification to governmental authorities
prior to, or simultaneous with, commencing an internal investiga-
tion . . . [for any] clear violation of administrative, civil or criminal
laws."1 14
In Deputy Attorney General Thompson's revised guidelines, pros-
ecutors are to consider whether a corporation, while purporting to
cooperate, has engaged in conduct that impedes an investigation-
whether or not the corporation's actions rise to the level of criminal
obstruction.11 5 A corporation "impedes the investigation," for exam-
ple, when it fails to promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the
corporation. 116 Even though the memorandum states that such
nondisclosure need not amount to obstruction of justice, the Justice
Department would punish the corporation as if it were. As previously
noted, the Justice Department recommended a two-level enhance-
ment for failure to report, which is equal to the enhancement for ob-
struction ofjustice.117
Both the Justice Department and HHS respectively take the view
that disclosure must be "prompt[ ],,L18 or "immediate."' 1 9 In doing
so, these departments impose a more rapid response than the Securi-
ties and Exchange Committee (SEC) required in the "Final" Sarbanes-
Oxley Rules on "Standards of Professional Conduct" for Attorneys.120 Given
112 See generally Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4 ("The main focus of the revi-
sions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's
cooperation.").
113 See Publication of the OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,399,
58,4000 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. Oct. 30, 1998). In 1998, the Inspector General
for HHS issued a voluntary disclosure program entitled "Provider Self-Disclosure Proto-
col," which states that "[t]he OIG believes [corporations] have an ethical and legal duty...
[which] includes an obligation to take measures, such as instituting a compliance program,
to detect and prevent fraudulent, abusive and wasteful activities." Id.
114 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed.
Reg. 23,731, 23,743 (May 5, 2003) (emphasis added).
115 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 8.
116 See id.
117 See Savage & Pratt, supra note 33, at 6.
118 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that prosecutors should
consider a corporation's "failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the
corporation").
119 See supra text accompanying note 114.
120 See 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 205(b)(1) (2000) (stating that attorneys




the reasons for the SEC's new rules and the process by which the SEC
adopted them, it would seem that its rules for public corporations set
a very high standard. The SEC's new rules require an attorney for a
public corporation to advise a client's general counsel or CEO 21
about "credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasona-
ble, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney
not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur."122 The Justice Depart-
ment apparently wanted the SEC rules to require corporations to re-
port "immediately" when they come into possession of information
about corporate misconduct. 12 3 The SEC, on the other hand, "explic-
itly recognizes that a 'reasonable investigation' should precede the at-
torney's advice."' 24
Even though the SEC has just recently issued these new require-
ments and they apply only to public corporations, the Justice Depart-
ment has for some time taken a more aggressive approach to virtually
all corporations it investigates. According to a letter from the Ameri-
can Counsel Association to the Clinton Justice Department in May
2000: "[I] t is the regular practice of U.S. Attorneys to require corpora-
tions to waive their attorney-client privileges and divulge confidential
conversations and documents in order to prove cooperation with
prosecutor's investigation." 125 Supposedly, the Bush Justice Depart-
ment, per the Thompson Memorandum, does not make waiver of the
attorney-client privilege the norm. 126 Yet, given the increase in corpo-
rate criminal investigations since the Enron collapse, 27 it is difficult
to imagine that federal prosecutors have become more restrained.
On the contrary, prosecutors who have the authority and often the
tendency to "push the envelope" are even more likely to do so in the
current climate. Despite the Justice Department's guidelines,
"[i]ndividual federal prosecutors have tremendous authority as to the
initiation and conduct of grand jury and other criminal investigations
of alleged wrongdoing on the part of business organizations,"' 28 as
Deputy Attorney General Thompson once wrote.
121 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
122 Id. § 205.2(e).
123 See Howard W. Goldstein, They're Here! Sort of... "Final" Sarbanes-Oxley Rules on
Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Feb. 2003, at 1, 4.
124 Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(b) (3) (i)).
125 Letter from the American Corporate Counsel Association to the U.S. Department
of Justice (May 12, 2000), http://www.acca.com/public/accapolicy/holder.html.
126 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 7.
127 See Press Release, White House, President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Compiles
Strong Record (July 22, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/2003/07/20030722.
html (describing increase in federal prosecutions).
128 Fairness, supra note 74, at 1.
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Under the Thompson Memorandum, in order to avoid waiver of
attorney-client privilege, the "DOJ sometimes offers corporations the
opportunity to avoid waiver outright, or limit it substantially, by al-
lowing the corporation to disclose through its employees rather than
through its attorneys." 129 Despite its benefits, this process raises tricky
problems for the attorneys, the corporation, and the employees in-
volved. t 30 "Most significantly, the DOJ clarification fails to address the
concern of cooperating corporations that disclosure of attorney-client
privilege or protected work product will be a waiver of such protec-
tions as to third parties and expose the corporation to civil
lawsuits."13 1
Under Supreme Court decisions, the protection of the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, as applied to corpo-
rate document production, has steadily eroded. 3 2 Given the impor-
129 GregoryJ. Wallance, Holder Memorandum Revisited: DOJ Offers Clarification of Corporate
Waiver, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Jan. 2003, at 7.
130 See id. at 7-8.
Thus, it would appear sufficient for the corporation's attorneys to notify the
government attorneys of the general nature of the wrongdoing that has
come to their attention and disclose "exactly what happened and who did
it" by making employee-witnesses available for interviews without waiving
any privileges. Further, the DOJ has formally stated that, where attorney-
related information must be disclosed to meet the "exactly what happened
and who did it" standard, such disclosures should usually be limited to
work-product protected materials. In most cases, this should mean disclo-
sure of interview notes or memoranda but not legal research or analysis nor
any conclusions that an attorney might reach regarding the legality of the
conduct at issue.
On the negative side, the DOJ's clarification offers no assistance to
companies whose employees or ex-employees were interviewed by the cor-
poration's attorneys but who refuse to be interviewed by prosecutors or who
assert their Fifth Amendment privilege in response to grand jury subpoe-
nas. In those circumstances, the company can earn credit for cooperation
only by disclosing, for example, its attorneys' notes or memoranda of the
employee interviews. Such disclosure may waive attorney-client or work
product protections.
Indeed, corporations may be whipsawed by two conflicting require-
ments for leniency credit: responding with appropriate disciplinary mea-
sures to employee wrongdoing and providing sufficient information to
prosecutors to meet the "exactly what happened and who did it" standard.
Once a corporation learns of an employee's culpable wrongdoing, then it
often has no choice but to discipline the offending employee by termina-
tion or suspension. If that happens, of course, the likelihood that the em-
ployee will appear voluntarily at the U.S. Attorney's Office to assist the
corporation in obtaining leniency diminishes substantially. Instead, the
employee is likely to retain an attorney and commence an often lengthy
and unpredictable process of plea bargaining, which leaves the company
with no disclosure recourse except to share attorney notes or memoranda
with the prosecutors.
Id.
131 Id. at 8.
132 See Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents
After United States v. Hubbell-New Protection for Private Papers, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123,
133-39 (2002); see also United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49-50 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
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tance of documents in corporate prosecutions, prosecutors either
attempt to seize them through subpoenas or warrants, or they can sim-
ply press corporations to turn them over "voluntarily." Without signif-
icant protection for corporations under the Fifth Amendment, the
Justice Department has been able to push aggressively for self-report-
ing and codes of conduct through tactics that threaten the constitu-
tional privilege.1 33 Although they have no assurance of any benefit for
compliance plans, corporations must nevertheless do much more
than not violate criminal laws because that is what federal agencies
demand. As stated above, according to the Inspector General of
HHS, affected corporations should provide for "immediate notifica-
tion to governmental authorities prior to, or simultaneous with, com-
mencing an internal investigation . . . [for any] clear violation of
administrative, civil, or criminal laws.' 34 The Justice Department's
corporate prosecution guidelines use the term "misconduct" to in-
clude conduct that is not necessarily criminal, but nevertheless is not
considered to be that of a "good citizen." 135 Thus, under the guise of
proscriptive criminal law enforcement, Justice Department policy is
creating comprehensive regulation-a regime of prescription.
The SEC does not have comprehensive regulatory authority even
over public corporations; yet while it does not actually compel public
corporations to adopt codes of conduct, it has made failure to do so
very difficult for them. 13 6 Corporations are creatures of the states,
concurring) ("[The act-of-production] doctrine may be inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause.... The key word at issue in
this case is "witness." The Court's opinion, relying on prior cases, essentially defines "wit-
ness" as a person who provides testimony, and thus restricts the Fifth Amendment's [pro-
tection] to only those communications 'that are "testimonial" in character.'") (quoting
Hubbell 530 U.S. at 34).
133 See David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The
Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147, 157 (2000)
("In this relationship between the government and company counsel .... the government
reaps the fruits of interviews while minimizing the risk that the employees will seek to
obtain separate counsel who might otherwise have advised them to assert the Fifth
Amendment.").
134 OIG Compliance Program Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed.
Reg. 23,731, 23,743 (May 5, 2003).
135 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that corporate compliance
programs should "detect misconduct and . . . ensure that corporate activities are con-
ducted in accordance with all applicable criminal and civil laws, regulations, and rules"
(emphasis added)).
136 See 2 THomAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.7[2],at 23-24
(4th ed. Supp. 2003):
Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to develop
rules requiring disclosures relating to public companies' codes of ethics.
Neither the statute nor the SEC rules expressly mandate that a public com-
pany has a code of ethics but the disclosure requirements clearly provide a
strong incentive since companies that do not adopt a code of ethics will
have to make that disclosure and will appear out of line with the companies
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and state law provides the requirements for corporate organization. 3 7
Federal law forms a fragmented overlay with particular legislation
passed under one or more of Congress's enumerated powers. The
securities laws, as administered by the SEC, are the most comprehen-
sive of the federal laws affecting public corporations.1 38 Since 1996,
the federal securities laws, which apply to public companies, have
largely preempted state securities laws.139 Despite the broad powers
that have adopted such a code. As such this is an indirect intervention in
corporate governance rather than mandating any particular structure.
In adopting the code of ethics disclosure requirements the SEC re-
quires companies to disclose whether they have adopted a corporate "code
of ethics" that covers the conduct of the company's principal executive and
senior financial officers. If the company has not a code of ethics, it must
explain why it has not done so. It is very likely that this will have the effect
of shaming companies into adopting a code of ethics. If a company has
adopted a code of ethics it must make the code available to the public. In
addition, the company must make disclosure when it amends its code of
ethics or when it grants specific waivers from the code's requirements.
In order to qualify as a "code of ethics" the code must include "written
standards that are reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing." In addition,
the code of ethics must be designed to promote honest and ethical con-
duct. Honest and ethical conduct includes how the company handles ac-
tual and apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional
relationships. The code of ethics must also be designed to promote full,
fair, accurate, and timely disclosures in the company's SEC filings as well as
in the company's public communications generally. The code of ethics
must be designed to promote compliance with laws, rules, and regulations
applicable to the company's business. The code of ethics must identify ap-
propriate reporting procedures within the organization with respect to
code violations. In particular, the code must identify "appropriate person
or persons" to whom reports of violations should be made. It is also essen-
tial that the a code of ethics adequately provides a system of accountability
to assure compliance with the code's substantive provisions. As noted
above, the company is not required to have a code of ethics with each of
these attributes. However, the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
Stock Market have both proposed rules that would require listed companies
to have these codes of ethics. In any event, if a public company either has
no code of ethics or has one that lacks any of these components, then the
Item 406 of Regulation S-K company must disclose that it does not have a
code of ethics.
Id.
137 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Corporations are crea-
tures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the under-
standing that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975))).
138 See HAZEN, supra note 136, at 2-3, 11-13.
139 See I id. § 8.1[3], at 747.
In 1996, Congress significantly limited the role of state law in securities
regulation. By enacting the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
of 1996, Congress reversed the pattern established under the first sixty-
three years of federal securities regulation which embodied concurrent
state and federal regulation. The 1996 amendments explicitly preempted
state law in many areas of securities regulation. Particularly affected are the




conferred on the SEC, the federal securities laws establish a "concep-
tual line excluding the Commission from corporate governance." 140
The federal government does not dictate forms of organization, be-
cause there is no general federal incorporation law-although some
have advocated such a law. 14  While there is no applicable federal
statute which directly provides for reform of nonpublic corporate or-
ganizations, federal sentencing guidelines, agency guidelines, and re-
cent Justice Department guidelines for prosecution are, in the
aggregate, a powerful instrument by which to "reform" corporate
governance.
The claim that fines do not adequately deter corporate crime has
been utilized tojustify the use of novel forms of sentencing to reform
corporations. 142 Of course, the notion that corporate crime "deter-
rence" is possible assumes that a corporation is capable of committing
a crime, that is, capable of forming mens rea. Given that a corporate
mens rea is entirely fictional, 143 the term "deterrence" used in this con-
Id.
140 Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 905 F.2d 406, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
141 See, e.g., RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 8 (1976) ("Through
a federal charter instrument new rights and remedies can be accorded affected citizens by
making the large corporate structure more anticipatory, self-correcting, and sensitive to
public needs.").
142 See Murphy, supra note 60, at 701 (citing United States v. Mo. Valley Constr. Co.,
741 F.2d 1542, 1551 (8th Cir. 1984) (HeaneyJ., concurring and dissenting) ("The present
practice of punishing corporate crime with fines paid to the United States Treasury has
done little to deter corporate crime.")).
143 SeeJEROME HALL, LAw, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 278-79 (1982).
By reference to a descriptive definition of "criminal law," a corporation
cannot commit a crime. If "corporation" is a fiction mens rea is irrelevant.
That it is some sort of human organ or group personality, as Gierke and
Maitland held, or that the "internal processes" of a corporate organization
are equivalent to the mens rea of human beings is not very persuasive.
Judges in countries where the fiction theory prevails have accepted these or
similar theses as the ground of imposing punitive sanctions on corpora-
tions. Thus, Lord Denning said that "a company has a brain and a nerve
center.... It also has hands ... directors and managers[,] ... [which]
represent the directing mind and will of the company and control what it
does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the com-
pany...." But some years later Lord Reid said, "A living person has a mind
which can have knowledge or intention or be negligent and he has hands
to carry out his intentions. A corporation has none of these." All of which
would seem to imply that a corporation cannot commit a crime. But, Lord
Reid continued, "[a human being, presumably a manager or other execu-
tive] is acting as the company and his mind, which directs his acts, is the
mind of the company." Surely, there is something amiss here in the nature
of a non sequitur Instead of indulgence in metaphor the realistic conclu-
sion might have been-a corporation cannot commit a crime but it is de-
fensible, perhaps useful, to subject a corporation to punitive sanctions in
certain cases. This would not have confused thinking about criminal law
and it would have focused attention on the pertinent question-the use of
penal sanctions for damage or injuries that are not criminal.
Id. (alterations added and in original) (footnotes omitted).
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text does not involve motivating the response of an intelligent being.
Deterrence in the context of so-called corporate crime more closely
resembles Pavlovian obedience training. The process does not involve
the rational premise of classic deterrence theory; 1 44 it is simply corpo-
rate regulation. Prosecutors are involved in corporate-wide behavior
modification on the unproven assumption that this will prevent crime.
This approach does not concern prohibition of wrongful acts; it
prescribes doing "good."
Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines, fines were the basic means of
punishing corporations. 145 For those who wanted to stigmatize corpo-
rations, however, fines were inadequate. 46 For those who simply
wanted to deter corporate misconduct, the effectiveness of fines was
and is a matter of debate. 147 For corporations, fines that did not carry
much stigma appeared, at most, to be as burdensome as civil fines. 148
Thus, prior to 1991, business organizations had little more incentive
to contest a criminal prosecution than a governmental civil action. It
did not matter much whether the proceeding against a corporation
was for a regulatory offense or for a true crime, because the sanction
was more or less the same. With the sentencing guidelines for organi-
zations, the Sentencing Commission attempted to make sentencing
more substantial. 149 There was insufficient debate about attempting
144 See id. at 256 ("The theory of deterrence rests on the premise of rational utility, i.e.,
that prospective offenders will weigh the evil of the sanction against the gain of the
imagined crime.").
145 See Murphy, supra note 60, at 701 n.16 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 104 (1983)).
146 See id. at 701 (citing Mo. Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d at 1551 (Heaney, J., concurring
and dissenting) ("Once the payment is made.., the public promptly forgets the transgres-




149 See David N. Yellen, Other Coordination Issues and Proposals (Sept. 8, 1995), in THE
GoOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra note 7, at 291.
The main [purposes of criminal punishment] that are applicable to organi-
zations are deterrence and retribution. Deterrence obviously plays a major
role in punishing corporate misconduct. We punish companies so they
won't do it again and so other companies will learn the lessons and they
won't do the same kind of things.
Retribution ought to, in theory at least, have a much lesser role in sanc-
tioning organizational misconduct. A company is not a person. As Profes-
sor Coffee from Columbia [Law School] wrote a long time ago, citing an
old case, it doesn't have a body to be kicked or a soul to be damned, so why
do we think about punishing organizations for punishment's sake?
But I think clearly in modern times, with the attention that has been
paid to corporate misconduct, people think about a need to punish compa-
nies that have done wrong, whether it is Exxon with the oil spill or lots of
other situations as well.
334
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to impose a criminal, i.e., moral, stigma on corporations; it was simply
assumed that such punishment was justified.1 50
Although the Sentencing Guidelines and Justice Department pol-
icies have significantly changed the regulation of corporations, the
congressional legislation responding to the current corporate scan-
dals may not be as significant as some claim. But the substantial in-
crease in resources will likely provide strong enforcement.151 Like the
post-Watergate reforms, the current reforms are likely misdirected.1 52
The most famous piece of so-called reform legislation from that era
was the Ethics in Government Law, with its ill-conceived Independent
Counsel statute.1 53 The legislative reaction to Watergate was also
aimed at reforming future lawyers by injecting ethics into the law
school curriculum and continuing legal education. 154 Thirty years
later, those reforms have not done much to refurbish the reputation
of the legal profession with the general public. For example, many
law firms connected with Enron have come under scrutiny in the re-
lated bankruptcy litigation because of their involvement in Enron's
finances.' 5 5 The new SEC attorney reporting requirements, 1 56 which
150 See Nagel & Swenson, supra note 84, at 214-15. In describing the work of the Sen-
tencing Commission on the organizational guidelines, the authors note that "the relevant
literature clearly illustrated a lack of consensus among academics regarding corporate sen-
tencing." Id. at 214 (emphasis added). Next, they mention the Commission's research
concerning the disparity of sentencing among corporations. Id. at 214-15. Then, in support
of sentencing corporations, they invoke public opinion about white collar crime generally,
which does not distinguish between individuals and organizations. Thus they say the Com-
mission "also recognized that some members of Congress, and a majority of the public,
perceived an unwarranted disparity in the severity of sentences meted out to white collar
offenders when compared to the severity of sentences meted out to non-white collar offenders."
Id. at 215 (emphases added). The discussion by two persons who themselves worked on
the organizational guidelines reflects that, apart from practical difficulties, appropriateness
of imposing a moral stigma on an abstract entity was not an issue seriously considered by
the Commission.
151 SeeJoseph F. Savage, Jr. & Stephanie R. Pratt, Sarbanes-Oxley: New Ways to Solve Old
Crimes, Bus. CRIMES BULL., Dec. 2002, at 1 (minimizing the significance of the new crimes
and enhanced penalties, but stating that "[t]wo of [Sarbanes-Oxley's] features may yield
significant changes: the increased enforcement resources and significant new tools de-
signed to develop witnesses, informants and other evidence for regulators and
prosecutors").
152 Other commentators have compared corporate crime to Watergate. In the mid-
1970s, Ralph Nader spoke of the then current "corporate crime wave," as a "corporate
Watergate," which required federal reform of corporations. See NADER, supra note 141, at
30.
153 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (2000); see also supra text accompanying note 102 (discussing
Justice Scalia's criticism of the Independent Counsel Statute).
154 See Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HAsTiNGS
L.J. 673, 673 (2000).
155 See Gary Young, 50 Law Firms Subpoenaed in Enron Bankruptcy, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10,
2003, at A26.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 1-22.
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diminish the self-regulating tradition of the legal profession,1 57 as-
sume that "lawyer ethics" have failed. The current corporate reforms,
however, like the post-Watergate reforms, are unlikely to affect ethics
in any significant manner.
Legal ethics scholars debate whether the approach to ethics
should be integrity-based or rule-oriented.1 58 The Sentencing Com-
mission opted for the "integrity based" approach. 159 Certainly rules,
without integrity, do not amount to ethical conduct. 60 Congress,
however, can only legislate rules or delegate rule-making. It cannot
legislate integrity. All too often, rules are adopted to satisfy the ap-
pearance of "doing something. "161
Corporate consultants will naturally advise their clients that "ef-
fective compliance programs, and their related controls, are the num-
ber one tools that companies have at their disposal to ensure that the
potential for violations of law are minimized and ethical behavior is
instilled within the business organization.' 1 62 If this were so, however,
Enron should have been the very model of an ethical company. "After
all, Enron Corp. had a compliance plan.., that was regarded as state-
of-the-art."1 63 Even before the Enron era, an attorney's failure to rec-
ommend a compliance plan might have constituted malpractice.1 64
While there may be good reasons, including cost, why a corporation
should not adopt such a program, 165 post-Enron pressures to adopt
compliance programs are powerful.
157 See Stephanie R.E. Patterson, Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Eroding the Legal
Profession's System of Self-Governance?, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 155, 175 (2003) ("Given the cur-
rent political and social climate resulting from multiple corporate scandals and the legal
profession's failure to provide adequate safeguards, guidance, and means of reporting cli-
ent wrongdoing, the legal profession could be in danger of losing its privilege of self-
regulation.").
158 See, e.g., Paine, supra note 64, at 106-07 (discussing advantages of an integrity-based
approach over an approach based merely on avoiding illegal activity).
159 See Didier, supra note 62, at 220.
160 See id. at 109-10.
161 See, e.g., Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 10 ("Prosecutors should
attempt to determine whether a corporation's compliance program is merely a 'paper pro-
gram' or whether it was designed and implemented in an effective manner.").
162 Bert F. Lacativo, Proactive Fraud Prevention: Creating Ethics and Compliance Programs
That Work with Sarbanes-Oxley, Bus. CRIMES BULL., July 2003, at 3, 8.
163 Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 50.
164 See Richard S. Gruner, Towards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corpo-
rate Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 ARIz. L. REv. 407, 432 n.176 (1994)
("[C]orporate counsel's failure to advise corporate clients about compliance programs
may amount to professional malpractice.").
165 See Murphy, supra note 49, at 393 ("The guidelines talk about effective programs to





STIGMATIZING AND PROSECUTING IN ORDER TO
CONTROL CORPORATIONS
Federal criminal law has significant practical and political advan-
tages over direct attempts to legislate new corporate regulation. Cor-
porations are loathe to criticize federal criminal laws; and even if they
did lobby against such legislation, their normal allies would be un-
available. Republicans supposedly favor business and, therefore, gen-
erally oppose corporate regulation.1 66 But if legislators add a criminal
penalty to any business regulation under the guise of the "War on
Crime," most congressional Republicans will vote for it.167 Opposing
business regulation may generate campaign contributions, but oppos-
ing crime produces the votes. Of course, when the two conflict, con-
victing "criminals" naturally comes first. Never mind that Congress's
commitment to creating more federal crime has meant that more citi-
zens are federal criminals. 68 Thus, after years of complaining about
what they labeled "outrageous" product liability litigation, Republi-
cans in the House of Representatives, in response to the Ford-Fire-
stone fiasco, led the effort in 2000 to pass legislation that turned
product liability into a federal crime.1 69
Targeting corporations for prosecution might arguably be justi-
fied if in fact such a policy had any real relationship to crime levels,
but economic crime has in fact declined since 1994.170 The public,
however, has a different impression due to the collapses of Enron and
WorldCom, and the sensational publicity which presumed guilt
166 See The American Dream: Prosperity With a Purpose, in REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., RE-
PUBLICAN PLATFORM 2000 (2000), at http://www.rnc.org/GOPInfo/Platform/2000plat-
form2.htm ("Inspired by Presidents Reagan and Bush, Republicans hammered into place
the framework for today's prosperity and surpluses. We cut tax rates, simplified the tax
code, deregulated industries, and opened world markets to American enterprise.").
167 See Renewing Family and Community, in REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., supra note 166, at
http://www.rnc.org/GOPInfo/Platform/2000platform4.htm. The Committee asserts:
While we support community policing and other proven initiatives against
crime, we strongly oppose any erosion of that responsibility by the federal
government. Our Republican governors, legislators, and local leaders have
taken a zero tolerance approach to crime that has led to the lowest crime
and murder rates in a generation.
Id.
168 See FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 10 ("[It is clear that the
amount of individual citizen behavior now potentially subject to federal criminal control
has increased in astonishing proportions in the last few decades.").
169 See Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation
(TREAD) Act of 2000 § 5(b), 49 U.S.C. § 30170(a)(1) (2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-
954, at 6-7 (2000) (describing the history of the Ford-Firestone litigation and its result in
the TREAD Act).
170 See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 5, at A29.
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before anyone provided the proof.17' Driven by "published opinion,"
the Bush Administration reacted with a flurry of indictments. Prose-
cutors obtained more than 250 corporate fraud convictions or guilty
pleas in the course of a year. 172 Almost all of those convictions would
have resulted from guilty pleas. 173 As the trial of Arthur Andersen
indicates, however, "white-collar" guilty pleas are suspect. The govern-
ment's star witness, auditor David Duncan, testified that he did not
think he had done anything criminal at the time of the relevant ac-
tions. 174 Later, after considering the government's offer of leniency
in return for his testimony, he changed his mind.1 75 Without agree-
ing to admit his guilt, he would not have been allowed to plead
guilty. 176 In the absence of other well-publicized trials, it is difficult to
know how many guilty pleas reflect actual guilt as opposed to perjured
pleas proffered to lessen the time, expense, and anxiety of the ordeal.
But we do know that the last media-driven frenzy over corporate
crime-the savings and loan collapses of the early 1990s-greatly ex-
aggerated corporate culpability. Although crimes did occur, most of
the institutions that failed did so because the commercial real estate
market collapsed.' 7 7 As later reported, the crash was inevitable after
Congress changed the law to allow thrifts to invest in commercial real
estate. 78
Since the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, the Republican-con-
trolled Congress and Justice Department have reacted with ill-con-
ceived legislation and scatter-shot prosecutions out of fear of political
171 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
92 (2000); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
92 (1999); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
92 (1998); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
95 (1997); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
69 (1996). Critics of corporations have claimed, at least since the term "white-collar crime"
was coined, that corporate crime has been rampant. See NADER, supra note 141, at 30-32.
According to Sentencing Commission statistics however, the number of federal cases
against corporations-as measured by sentences-has been in the range of 200 to 300. See
supra note 110.
172 See Press Release, White House, President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Compiles
Strong Record (July 22, 2003), http//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/
20030722.html.
173 SeeJED RAKOFF ET AL., CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: COMPLIANCE AND MITIGA-
TION 3 (1993).
174 See Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Andersen's Lawyer Paints Duncan as Pressured to Plead, TEX.
LAw., May 20, 2002, at 1.
175 See id.
176 See id.
177 See Raphaelson et al., supra note 2. As later reported, the crash was inevitable after
Congress changed the law to allow thrifts to invest in commercial real estate. See NAT'L
COMM'N ON FIN. INST. REFORM, RECOVERY, & ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE
S&L DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 8 (1993).
178 See NAT'L COMM'N FOR FIN. INST. REFORM, RECOVERY, & ENFORCEMENT, supra note
177, at 7.
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fallout. In doing so, the political branches are marching to the drum-
beat of the media. The reporting, by and large, seems to accept the
anti-corporate ideological premises discussed below,' 79 which under-
lie the movement to stigmatize corporations as criminals. That is not
to say that members of Congress or the Justice Department necessarily
share those same ideological premises. Rather they are driven
predominantly by the fear of losing power.1 8 0 The motivations of
prosecutors are more varied, as described by Deputy Attorney General
Thompson before he assumed that position:
Obviously, prosecutors are like the rest of us and are imbued
with all the human frailties we possess. Some people, for many rea-
sons, believe that large, high profile business organizations are too
powerful economically. Other people possess a healthy dose of am-
bition which is a positive trait in most instances but which can lead
to bad judgments in others.1 8 1
Whatever the individual motivations, the dynamics of process propel
Congress to give more power to federal prosecutors who, as a group,
do not fail to use it.
A. Wealth and Corporations: A Constant Source of Controversy
Political struggle over corporations represents a recurring theme
in American life. At the time of our Founding and for several decades
thereafter, corporations were quasi-public entities that "functioned
very much like arms of government, usually serving some specific pub-
lic end.' 8 2 The opposition to the first and second national banks in-
volved more than opposition to federal power as such; the opponents
criticized the monopoly status of these quasi-public entities. 18 3 The
quasi-public role of corporations was consistent with the mercantilist
view of trade, which prevailed before Adam Smith's views took
hold.' 8 4 Adam Smith and Thomas Jefferson both opposed corpora-
tions because their quasi-public nature produced special privileges
179 See infra text accompanying notes 180-84.
180 See generally Brian T. FitzPatrick, Congressional Re-election Through Symbolic Politics: The
Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1 (1994) (arguing that congressional
crackdowns on white-collar criminals are often the result of a desire to appear tough on
crime during election periods).
181 Fairness, supra note 74, at 3.
182 JAMIL ZAINALDIN, LAW IN ANTEBELLUM SOCIETY: LEGAL CHANGE AND ECONOMic Ex-
PANSION 43 (1983).
183 Id. at 47.
184 Id. at 43-44.
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and monopolies.'8 5 Later, Jacksonian Democrats promoted privatiza-
tion and democratization by enacting general incorporation laws.186
When private corporations after the Civil War became more pow-
erful than the states that chartered them, states attempted to control
them through the use of criminal penalties.187 In part, corporations
grew more powerful because the Supreme Court afforded corpora-
tions certain advantages and freed them from various state restric-
tions.18 8 But the states still had their criminal powers. Although states
could not jail a corporation, they could damage its reputation with a
criminal conviction and penalize it with a fine.
A comparison of pre-Jacksonian corporations as quasi-public enti-
ties with the "good citizen" view underlying current federal efforts to
reform corporations reveals interesting similarities. Scholar Jamil
Zainaldin describes the basis for earlier quasi-public corporations as
follows:
In return for limited grants of immunity, monopoly, and privilege
to corporate bodies, the state retained the authority to structure in-
dividual charters in the public's interest.... State governments stipu-
lated that corporation officers must submit annual accounting report,
and lawmakers reserved the power to amend, renew, alter, or with-
draw the charter. Lawmakers also placed strict limits on what cor-
porations could and could not do. "All corporate acts which the
legislature has not authorized remain prohibited, "and officials and courts
were to construe their charters with a "narrow, jealous eye." Fur-
ther, states regulated the internal management of corporate bodies- the co-
ercive powers of officers, stockholders' meetings, voting, stock
prices, and stock issuance. States might even direct how funds were
to be invested.' 8 9
Unlike the nineteenth century approach, the current agent of
change has not been state government, but the federal government.
Without a general federal law on incorporation, however, the tool of
federal power is criminal law. The growth of federal criminal law,
often identified as resulting from the Civil War, has had a tortuous
history involving confusion between the federal government's broad
power to regulate commerce and its criminal police power, which is
not a general power, but rather depends on the enumerated pow-
185 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 700 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) ("[Joint
stock companies] very seldom succeeded without an exclusive privilege; and frequently
have not succeeded with one. Without an exclusive privilege they have commonly misman-
aged the trade. With an exclusive privilege they have both mismanaged and confined it.");
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 320 (1992).
186 ZAINALDIN, supra note 182, at 47.
187 Id.
188 See CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 208-29 (1943).
189 ZAINALDIN, supra note 182, at 44-45 (emphasis added).
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ers. °90 The regulatory and the police powers came together in, and
expanded from, Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case)t9' in 1903.192 Six
years later in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United
States,193 the Supreme Court departed from the common law view to
permit prosecutions of corporations. 194 Taken together, these deci-
sions established the basis for the federal government's regulation
and criminal punishment of corporations. Due to the constitutional
structure of federalism and the continuing influence of mens rea in
criminal law, 1 95 it was many decades before the full potential of exert-
ing regulatory control over private corporations would be realized
under the rubric of "white-collar crime."
B. Invention of the Term "White-Collar Crime"
The terms "white-collar crime" and its offshoot, "organized
crime," reflect an attempt to change the basic understanding of the
definition of a crime. The inventor of the term "white-collar crime,"
Professor Edwin Sutherland, strongly disagreed with the most basic
substantive and procedural principles of criminal law. In his
landmark book, White Collar Crime,196 first published in 1949, Professor
Sutherland objected to the requirement of mens rea and the presump-
tion of innocence. 1 97 He argued that the "rules of criminal intent and
presumption of innocence . . . are not required in all prosecution in
criminal courts and the number of exceptions authorized by statutes is
increasing." 198 If nothing else, this attack on the foundational princi-
190 See generally John S. Baker, Jr., Nationalizing Criminal Law: Does Organized Crime Make
It Necessary Or Proper?, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 495, 513-31 (1985) (analyzing the interactions
between the commerce and criminal police powers).
191 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
192 See Baker, supra note 190, at 521-31; see also Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 362 (holding
that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce "may sometimes be exerted with
the effect of excluding particular articles from such commerce").
193 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
194 See id. at 494-95.
195 Although the Supreme Court allowed the prosecution of corporations long ago, it
is understandable that relatively few such prosecutions occurred. Corporations were not
subject to criminal prosecution under common law. See ZAINALDIN, supra note 182, at 50-
51. As nonhuman persons, they were incapable of possessing mens rea, the essential ele-
ment of a guilty mind for all common law crimes. See LAFAvE & Scos-r, supra note 71,
§ 3.4(a), at 297. In order to prosecute corporations as criminals, it was necessary either to
eliminate formally the mens rea requirement, or to permit proving it fictionally by imputing
the mens rea of some individual to the corporation. Still, as long as public support was
lacking, prosecution of what has since been labeled "white-collar crime" was not very likely.
See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 200 (1980) ("Major public
concern about the lack of corporate social responsibility first appeared prior to World War
I, largely as a result of the disclosures by the muckrakers .. .
196 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION (1983).




pie of the presumption of innocence should have discredited what
followed from that premise.
1. A Presumption of Guilt
Professor Sutherland made the amazing claim that corporations
were routinely determined to be guilty of crimes without the presump-
tion of innocence. 19 9 He was referring, however, to civil and regula-
tory cases, not criminal cases.20 0 Thus, Sutherland labeled all types of
business conduct as criminal without proof of any crime occurring,
because he thought proof of corporate culpability unimportant. He
justified this mislabeling, despite the lack of criminal procedure pro-
tection, by noting that the powerful receive better treatment in the
legal system. 20 1 As Sutherland stated:
The thesis of this book, stated positively, is that persons of the
upper socioeconomic class engage in much criminal behavior; that
this criminal behavior differs from the criminal behavior of the
lower socioeconomic class principally in the administrative proce-
dures which are used in dealing with the offenders; and that varia-
tions in administrative procedures are not significant from the point
of view of causation of crime. 20 2
[M]any of the defendants in usual criminal cases, being in rela-
tive poverty, do not get good defense and consequently secure little
benefit from these rules; on the other hand, the commissions come
close to observing these rules of proof and evidence although they
are not required to do so. 203
Professor Sutherland was intent on providing a basis for facilitat-
ing more convictions of executives and corporations by reconceptual-
izing crime through the term "white-collar crime." Thus, he
supported a Federal Trade Commission determination that a corpora-
tion's violation of a regulation is a "white-collar crime."20 4 Professor
Sutherland equated "adverse decisions" by regulatory agencies with
criminal convictions. 20 5 As to those involved in business, Professor
Sutherland in effect reversed the presumption of innocence to one of
guilt, to facilitate establishing their criminal liability.20 6 Accordingly,
he defined white-collar crime "as a crime committed by a person of
199 See id. at 53.
200 See id. at 45.
201 See id. at 6.
202 Id. at 7.
203 Id. at 53.
204 See id. at 49.
205 See id. at 49-50.
206 See id. at 56-57.
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respectability and high social status in the course of his occupa-
tion."20 7 In doing so, he drained the word "crime" of its meaning.
Professor Sutherland made distinctions not on the basis of the
crime but according to the status of the accused. 20 8 As some of his
supporters stated:
The term white-collar crime served to focus attention on the social
position of the perpetrators and added a bite to commentaries
about the illegal acts of businessmen, professionals, and politicians
that is notably absent in the blander designations, such as "occupa-
tional crime" and "economic crime," that sometimes are employed
to refer to the same kinds of lawbreaking .... 209
They also noted that Professor Sutherland was "intent upon... press-
ing a political viewpoint ... "210 Moreover, he did so in a "tone . . .
reminiscent of the preaching of outraged biblical prophets."211
Professor Sutherland's influence is clearly evident in the sub-
stance and practice of federal criminal law. Many federal offenses
prosecuted under the label of "white-collar crime" are regulatory or
public welfare offenses, rather than true crimes.212 The principal ar-
chitect of the organizational guidelines cites Professor Sutherland's
"social science research," among that of others, to explain the need
for the guidelines, namely the "evidence of preferential treatment for
white collar offenders."213
2. Stigma Without Sin
Anyone convinced that another person or class of persons is
guilty of crime tends to become impatient with legal niceties. Profes-
sor Sutherland and those who assume the guilt of corporations believe
that the ordinary protections of the law need not apply to those in-
volved in business.214 But when others even imply such a pre-judg-
ment about any other group, including terrorists, civil libertarians cry
"tyranny." Yet, a civil libertarian outcry in defense of corporate de-
fendants is most unlikely. Concluding that those engaged in business
do not deserve the presumption of innocence, Professor Sutherland
dispenses with the essential (and often most difficult to prove) ele-
207 Id. at 7.
208 See id. at 265 n.7 ("The term 'white collar' is used here to refer principally to busi-
ness managers and executives, in the sense in which it was used by a president of General
Motors who wrote 'An Autobiography of a White Collar Worker.'").
209 Gilbert Geis & Colin Goff, Introduction to SUTHERLAND, supra note 196, at xviii.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 SeeJULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 54 (2001).
213 Nagel & Swenson, supra note 84, at 216 & n.51. Co-author Winthrop M. Swenson
"was responsible for the staff group that developed the basis for the organizational guide-
lines." Swenson, supra note 25, at 29.
214 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 196, at 60.
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ment of crime: a guilty mind.21 5 Although it is unconstitutional to
eliminate the presumption of innocence,21 6 one can circumvent this
by eliminating the troublesome part of the proof: the mental element
requirement.
Professor Sutherland dismissed the most fundamental principles
of criminal law in pursuing his belief that criminal convictions unfairly
stigmatize the poor, while regulatory offenses do not stigmatize the
rich and powerful enough.21 7 Claiming the criminal law should treat
the two classes more equally, he wrote:
Seventy five percent of the persons committed to state prisons are
probably not, aside from their unesteemed cultural attainments,
"criminals in the usual sense of the word." It may be excellent pol-
icy to eliminate the stigma of crime from violations of law by both
the upper and the lower classes, but we are not here concerned with
policy.
2 1 8
Professor Sutherland was unable to eliminate the stigma of crime,
although dispensing with the mens rea requirement should theoreti-
cally achieve this goal. Admittedly, the term that he coined, "white-
collar crime," has ensured that, in the quest for greater egalitarianism,
the stigma of crime has been applied to much of corporate America.
But before society stigmatizes and punishes a criminal defendant, the
rule of law requires that reliable procedures determine the defen-
dant's culpability. Although Marxist academics might wish it were so,
it is not a crime to be wealthy or powerful.
By eliminating the culpability requirement, Professor Sutherland
was able to facilitate the application of stigma to crime.219 His book
charges that the "70 corporations [discussed in his book] committed
crimes according to 779 adverse decisions [although] the criminality
of their behavior was . . . blurred and concealed by special proce-
dures."220 The complexity of business transactions may make it more
difficult to prove criminal activity. It is equally possible, however, that
in a particular case no criminal conduct occurred. Without requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a clearly stated mens rea, there is
no basis for distinguishing guilty from innocent actions. When prose-
cutors indict corporations or their executives for federal crimes, the
absence of a need to prove or the ease of proving mens rea results in
convictions where actual innocence has been "blurred and
concealed." 221
215 See LAFAvE & Scotrr, supra note 71, § 3.4(a), at 297.
216 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979).
217 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 196, at 6.
218 Id. at 55.
219 See id. at 54-55, 60.




Traditionally, the stigma of crime attaches only to individuals
proven to have been "morally culpable" by virtue of having acted with
a guilty state of mind.22 2 In Professor Sutherland's view, the tradi-
tional rule is wrong. Rather, culpability involves an externalized stan-
dard of whether a defendant's acts violated the "moral sentiments" of
the people. 223 Of course, as the Supreme Court has forcefully stated,
the most basic "moral sentiment" is that society not stigmatize persons
as criminals unless they have a guilty mind.
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is
as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in free-
dom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the
normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation be-
tween some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is
almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't
mean to," . . 224
Professor Sutherland and his successors greatly expanded the
scope of crime by shifting the focus to corporations and individuals in
the upper socioeconomic classes. 22 5 A lawyer-sociologist critic of Suth-
erland's work, Paul W. Tappan, long-ago noted that Professor Suther-
land's definition of crime departed from the legal definition. 22 6
Professor Tappan charged that this development was a "seductive
movement to revolutionize the concepts of crime and [the] crimi-
nal. . ."227 According to him, Professor Sutherland's "white-collar
crime" includes "a boor, a sinner, a moral leper or the devil incarnate
but he does not become a criminal through sociological name-call-
ing."2 28 The term "white-collar crime" later expanded to include such
an array of crime that it has become too amorphous for analysis. 229
Some sociologists, however, found even Sutherland's very loose defini-
tion "too restrictive" and "have dropped the class of the offender as a
222 See LAFAvE & Sco-r, supra note 71, § 3.4(a), at 297.
223 See SUTHERLAND, supra note 196, at 55.
224 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952).
225 HALL, supra note 72, at 278-83.
226 See Paul W. Tappan, Who Is the Criminal?, 12 AM. Soc. REv. 96, 98-99 (1947) ("Ap-
parently the criminal may be law obedient but greedy; the specific quality of his crimes is
far from clear.").
227 Id. at 98. In his foreword to the 1961 edition of Professor Sutherland's book White
Collar Crime, Professor Donald R. Cressey commented that the book "clearly was not an
attempt to extend the concept, 'crime,' despite the beliefs of some reviewers." EDWIN H.
SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CIME iv (2d ed. 1961). He characterized the criticism of
Tappan and another critic as "extraneous." Id. Professor Jerome Hall, however, has writ-
ten that "Tappan's attack was devastating." HALL, supra note 143, at 276.
228 Tappan, supra note 226, at 100.
229 See HALL, supra note 143, at 275.
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relevant element. '2 30 Thus, "white-collar" crime has become a divi-
sion of organizational crime. 23 1
The movement by the Justice Department to force corporations
to waive their privilege of self-incrimination is quite consistent with
Professor Sutherland's thesis that "white-collar" criminals are not en-
titled to the same constitutional protections afforded other defend-
ants because their financial resources allow them to abuse criminal
procedures. Thus, the Justice Department recently reflected that very
attitude when requesting that the Sentencing Commission disallow
departures from the sentencing guidelines for "white collar criminal
defendants, who typically have sophisticated counsel.', 3 2
Compared to his proteg6 Donald Cressey, Professor Sutherland
might seem to have been a cheerleader for corporate America. Al-
though mentored by a proteg6 of socialist Thornstein Veblen,2 3 Pro-
fessor Sutherland "fundamentally was an advocate of free enterprise,"
albeit a highly regulated form thereof.234 At the conclusion of his
book, he said that the upper class commit many crimes, but he could
not say whether "the upper class is more criminal or less criminal than
the lower class, for the evidence is not sufficiently precise to justify compari-
sons and common standards and definitions are not available." 23 5 De-
spite this lack of evidence, Cressey has repeatedly preached to college
students through his standard college text in Criminology that "the
people of the business world are probably more criminalistic than the people of
the slums."
2 3 6
Cressey was instrumental in the creation of the "enterprise" con-
cept, which is at the core of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO).237 Supposedly designed to target "organized
crime," prosecutors have used this statute to indict all kinds of corpo-
rations, and private parties have used it to sue most major corpora-
230 CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 195, at 18.
231 See id. at 17.
232 Letter from Eric H. Jaso, Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, DOJ, to the Honorable Diana E. Murphy, Chair, United States Sentencing Com-
mission (Oct. 1, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/sentencing-guidelines.htm (em-
phasis added).
233 See Geis & Goff, supra note 209, at xxv.
234 Id. at xvi.
235 SUTHERLAND, supra note 196, at 264 (emphasis added).
236 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEV, CRIMINOLOGY 51 (10th ed. 1978);
EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND ET AL., CRIMINOLOGY 66 (11th ed. 1992) (emphasis added).
237 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
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tions as well as the Catholic Church. 23 8 All have been labeled
"organized criminals."23 9
C. White-Collar Crime, Organized Crime, and Terrorism: What
Is the Difference?
However loosely organized, terrorists fall into the category of "or-
ganized crime," alongside corporations that commit criminal acts.
Since the back-to-back collapses in 2001 of the World Trade Center
towers (through the acts of terrorists) and of Enron (through the acts
of corporate executives), the new "wars" on terrorism and corporate
corruption have dovetailed and simulated the old war on organized
crime. The Justice Department, led by organized-crime prosecu-
tors, 2 40 has become an extension of the Defense Department in the
"war on terrorism," as the USA PATRIOT Act provides a new role for
law enforcement in fighting terrorism. 24 1 The boundaries between
war and law enforcement are now very blurry.
In these new wars, libertarians have attempted to push a judicial
model further into the theater of war,24 2 and statists have been consol-
idating federal law enforcement powers under the cover of war.243
Whether intentionally or not, the Justice Department has enhanced
its "war on terrorism" with its war on corporate corruption. While civil
liberties activists protested the wide-scale roundups of Arab aliens and
the shutdown of Arab organizations, the Justice Department displayed
238 See Nicholas R. Mancini, Mobsters in the Monastery? Applicability of Civil RICO to the
Clergy Sexual Misconduct Scandal and the Catholic Church, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 193,
195-96 (2002) (discussing application of RICO to Catholic Church and other
corporations).
239 See id. at 232-33.
240 See Tony Locy & Kevin Johnson, Legal 'Gladiator' Wants Justice Swift and Sure, USA
TODAY, Aug. 14, 2002, at 4A.
241 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, §§ 201-225, 115 Stat. 272, 278-96 (2001).
242 See William Zolla II, The War at Home: Rising Tensions Between Our Civil Liberties and
Our National Security, CBA RECORD, Feb./Mar. 2003, at 32 ("[C]ivil libertarians and their
allies believe that unless the Government is constrained by the commands of the Constitu-
tion, particularly in times of domestic unrest, the civil liberties of all Americans will ultimately
be diminished." (emphasis added)).
243 SeeJohn W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom"for "Home-
land Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice Department's
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1081, 1083 (2002) ("Under the guise of stopping
terrorism, law enforcement officials and government leaders have now been given the
right to conduct searches of homes and offices without prior notice, use roving wiretaps to
listen in on telephone conversations, and monitor computers and e-mail messages, even to
the degree of eavesdropping on attorney/client conversations.").
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its bona fides by rounding up corporate executives and shutting down
a prominent symbol of American capitalism-Arthur Andersen.
2 4 4
1. Threatening Legitimate Businesses as Mobsters and Terrorists
The "perp walks" of CEOs being led off in handcuffs were
scripted to "send a message" that "white-collar criminals" would be
treated severely.2 45 Ordinarily, nonviolent criminals are not led off in
handcuffs.246 Corporate executives were being treated like mobsters,
if not terrorists, though. 24 7 The "war" against corporate crime came at
the same time that the chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Di-
vision, a former organized crime prosecutor, was also directing the
Justice Department's "war on terrorism. ' 248 While civil libertarians
have protested the Justice Department's treatment of suspected ter-
rorists, little if any concern has been publicly expressed about possible
abuses of the civil liberties of corporations and their executives.
Policies adopted by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for fi-
nancial institutions certainly suggest a willingness on the part of some
federal officials to treat even legitimate businesses as if they were ter-
rorists. The following statement by the Treasury Department's Gen-
eral Counsel demonstrates that the Department has used anti-terrorist
tactics quite ruthlessly, even against businesses known to be innocent.
Let me first tell you about that Executive Order, because it's
important you get the perspective of where the PATRIOT Act falls
in. It is not our only tool. It would be a fool's errand to think it was.
The Executive Order that we wrote is global in scope. It specifically
targets financiers of terror. It uses an operative phrase, which is an
invention of my own, which is it reaches not only people knowingly associ-
ated with it but anyone otherwise associated with the act of transmission.
That was written deliberately so that there was no mens rea, that there was
no scienter, that it was strict liability.
What we wanted to do is try to create a code of conduct here and
abroad so that you are strictly liable for what happens in your insti-
tution. We understand it was unprecedented. We understand it's bold.
But it's worked; I can tell you it's worked. I know how it's worked.
244 See Press Release, White House, President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Compiles
Strong Record (July 22, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20
030722.html (describing increase in federal prosecutions).
245 See Benjamin Weiser, Same Walk, Nicer Shoes: Parading of Executives in Custody Fuels
New Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at BI ("Officials have said that highly public arrests
can serve as a deterrent to other executives, and send a message that the government is
serious about combating corporate crime.").
246 See Edward Iwata, Prosecutors Give CEOs the Mobster Treatment, USA TODAY, Oct. 4,
2002, at lB.
247 Id.
248 See Locy & Johnson, supra note 240, at 4A.
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I know that when we suspected that transactions have gone
through institutions abroad or through intermediaries abroad, like
lawyers, we've gone to them, sometimes directly, sometimes through
intermediaries, and sometimes through their host governments.
We've told them we don't believe you know this. We believe you're too casual
about things. We don't think your financial controls are good, so we're not
going to do anything. We want you to be our partner. So share your books
and records with us.
We didn't have to complete the rest of that paragraph, because they
know the Order. If they decline to give us the books and records and decline
to be our partners, we would name not only their institution under the Exec-
utive Order that is freezing the assets and prohibiting all trade with that
institution, but we would freeze the assets and prohibit trade with the fiduci-
aries in charge of those institutions.
Now in this respect the Executive Order is a powerful tool. It's
better inform of threat than actual execution. I can't tell you how we'd do in
a court of law if somebody challenged it. But anyway it's an extraordi-
nary power under national security measures, and the President en-
joys an awful lot of leeway with such circumstances. 249
The Treasury Department deliberately used strict liability to co-
erce codes of conduct and self-reporting from corporations: hardly
"voluntary" compliance. Plans have also been announced to extend
money-laundering rules to smaller businesses, such as car dealerships
and travel agencies. 250
2. Stigmatizing Produces Pleas
Even without the labels "mobster," "terrorist," or "white-collar
criminal," crime can stir strong emotions. Victims of crime often want
revenge. In criminal trials, legitimate sympathies emerge from testi-
mony, credibility, and character of the witnesses. 25 1 In close cases,
sympathy for a victim can influence ajury towards conviction, 252 while
sympathy towards a defendant can produce a conviction for a lesser
crime or even an acquittal. 253 At some point, sympathetic bias be-
249 Excerpted from remarks by General Counsel Aufhauser at the Federalist Society's
National Lawyers Convention, Nov. 15, 2002 (unpublished transcript, on file with author)
(emphasis added).
250 See Edward Iwata, Businesses Fear Red Tape, Cost of Patriot Act, USA TODAY, Apr. 10,
2003, at B2.
251 See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRiAL 146, 153 (1999).
252 Scott E. Sundby, The Capitaljury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy
Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 343, 349-58 (2003) (presenting data which suggests that victim
characteristics have significant effect on jury deliberations).
253 See generally John Clark, The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification, 24 L. & PSYCHOL.




comes prejudice.2 54 Although the dividing line may be difficult to dis-
cern in practice, adhering to the rule of law requires purging criminal
trials of prejudice, for or against a defendant, based on race, religion,
gender, or any extraneous emotion.25 5
Corporations neither deserve nor attract our sympathy. Sympa-
thy involves the capacity for sharing or understanding the feelings or
interests of others. Modern corporations are abstract, impersonal,
utilitarian entities lacking emotions and a personal story, and as such
they do not deserve sympathy simply because they are not human.
For that reason alone, they should not be the subjects of criminal
prosecution. Whatever sympathy corporations incur is the result of
shared feelings and interests among the human beings involved in the
corporation. Sympathy (or antipathy) may result from relationships
between and among the various groups of persons associated with cor-
porations: customers, employees, managers, officers, directors, and
shareholders. In the conduct of those relationships, individuals some-
times commit crimes for which, as individuals, they can and should be
prosecuted.
When a corporation is criminally prosecuted, it can expect little
sympathy because it will be judged by persons who cannot sympathize
with a thing-a nonhuman, artificial "person." In the public mind,
corporations are valuable insofar as they provide employment, pro-
duce goods and services, and provide returns to shareholders. When
they fail to do any of these activities, they are "bad" because they have
lost some or all of their utility. Since public corporations lost a great
deal of or all of their inflated values, many stockholders have become
quite angry. Where executives took actions on behalf of corporations
that appeared to be "very bad," even though not criminal, prosecutors
have an advantage in obtaining guilty pleas because those involved
know the jurors will be sympathizing with workers and stockholders.
Once the media personalizes terrorists, mobsters, and even serial
killers as "individuals,"-as it inevitably does after they are caught 25 6-
254 See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."). See generally Thirty-second Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: Influences on the Jury, 91 GEO. L. J. 513 (2003) (discussing various types of juror
influences and the point at which the impact of each exceeds harmless error).
255 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICtAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(5), (6) (2002) (obligating the
trial judge to refrain and to require the lawyers to refrain from manifesting bias or
prejudice based on race, sex, religion, etc.).
256 For examples of such in-depth profiles, see Case Closed: Infamous Criminals: At
Capone, at www.bbc.co.uk/crime/caseclosed/alcapone.shtml (last visited on Oct. 27, 2003);
Court TV's Crime Library: Criminal Minds and Methodr Attack!, at www.crimelibrary.com/
bundy/attack.htm (last visited on Oct. 27, 2003) (profiling serial killer Ted Bundy); The




these defendants generate more sympathy than do corporations and
their executives. The greater an individual's crime, the more fasci-
nated the media becomes with that defendant, as reflected in the me-
dia's efforts to explain what motivates particularly heinous crimes, 257
such as the Washington, D.C.-area sniper killings. 258 This media ob-
session might suggest, therefore, that individual corporate executives
whom the government indicts would fare at least as well as terrorists
and serial killers. They do not, however, because their luxurious lifes-
tyles make it easy to caricature them as greedy people who achieved
their elite status through wrongdoing rather than hard work. The
public reacts differently to indicted corporate executives than it does
to indicted actors and sports stars who also live lives of luxury.259 The
vast difference between lifestyles of celebrities and the general public
does not prevent the public from identifying with the celebrities. In-
deed, celebrities have gained their wealth and elite status through
their public approval, as their fans demonstrate by feeling a friendship
with and desiring to be like their idols. Although stars are different,
they are still "like us."
Corporations and their executives are easily demonized. This an-
tipathy allows federal prosecutors to proceed without much public
scrutiny of the charges. Federal judges can normally be relied on to
restrain the actions of overzealous prosecutors, 260 but too many fed-
eral judges allow overzealous interpretations of federal criminal
257 See id,
258 See, e.g., Michael E. Ruane & Sari Horwitz, Struggling For a Direct Connection, WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 2003, at Al (exploring the snipers' attempts to contact the media and publi-
cize their demands and reasons for the killings).
259 Compare, e.g., Tim Dahlberg, Kobe Leads in Court of Public Opinion (Aug. 6, 2003),
http://www.msnbc.com/news/949356.asp, and Rob Reynolds, 'What a Farce" Simpson Trial
Draws Jeers 'Round the World (Oct. 3, 1995), http://www.cnn.com/US/OJ/verdict/world/,
withJulia Hood, 'No Comment' Won't Cut It, PR WEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, at 3 (finding that "65%
of American's believe Enron executives did something illegal").
260 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Canon 3B(6) (2003):
A judge shall require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain
from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race,
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeco-
nomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. This Section
3(B) (6) does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, na-
tional origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, or
other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding.
This provision
gives judges the duty [ ] to prevent attorneys from engaging in improper
tactics that will prejudice the jury during the course of the judicial proceed-
ings. The judge's duty to "require" means that the judge must exercise
"reasonable direction and control over the conduct of those persons sub-
ject to the judge's direction and control."
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY § 60-8, 832 (2d ed. 2002) (footnote omitted).
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law. 26 1 While previously a defense attorney, Deputy Attorney General
Thompson wrote "Although many white collar violations involve
clearly recognizable false statements and fraud, other white collar in-
vestigations often involve more ambiguous conduct. ' 2 62 Faced with
uncertain constructions of federal statutes 26 3 and unfriendly juries,
corporate defendants feel a great deal of pressure to plead guilty, re-
gardless of the merits of the case. 264
Governments normally punish only the guilty. It is "normal" both
in the statistical and the moral sense of the term. Thus, it is disturbing
news every time DNA evidence establishes that the state convicted an
innocent person. Wrongful convictions, however numerous, are not
normal, because they violate a fundamental norm that criminal law
should differentiate guilt from innocence. Thus, each story about a
wrongfully convicted individual raises concern about possible, un-
known victims of injustice. When the media publicizes these cases,
concern also arises that procedures intended to protect the innocent
have failed. If the number of wrongfully convicted persons ever
achieves statistical significance, what would control our judgment: the
statistical norm or the moral norm?
The American public would never knowingly condone convicting
the innocent. When influenced by media coverage and opinion, how-
ever, the public can assume away the issue of guilt or innocence.
Thus, prejudice created by pretrial publicity can prevent a fair trial for
a defendant in a particular community. 265 In a nationwide media
market, prejudicial publicity that demonizes corporations can affect
every case and drive corporate defendants to plead guilty.
261 Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 643, 662-68 (1997) (discussing federal courts' broad interpretation of jurisdictional
elements of federal criminal law).
262 Fairness, supra note 74, at 3.
263 See O'SULLIVAN, supra note 212, at 53.
Part of the ambiguity is founded upon the fact that a seemingly endless
variety of terms have been used to describe the guilty mind necessary to
prove an offense. Federal statutes, for example, provide for more than 100
types of mens rea. Even those terms most frequently used in federal legisla-
tion-"knowing" and "willful"-do not have one invariable meaning. Par-
ticularly with respect to judicial interpretation of the term "willful," the
precise requirements of these terms depend to some extent on the statu-
tory context in which they are employed. Another layer of difficulty is at-
tributable to the fact that Congress may impose one mens rea requirement
upon certain elements of the offense and a different level of mens rea, or no
mens rea at all, with respect to other elements.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
264 See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
265 See Brian V. Breheny & Elizabeth M. Kelly, Maintaining Impartiality: Does Media Cover-
age of Trials Need to be Curtailed?, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 371, 377-80 (1995)




Whatever theory or approach one adopts to justify corporate
criminal liability, one cannot escape from the reality that corporations
are being punished without regard for culpability. To say that a cor-
poration is "at fault" for the acts or omissions of its officers, directors,
or employees dispenses with mens rea.266 Mens rea is not just any fault,
but moral fault.26 7 Whatever mens rea an officer, director, or employee
had is particular to that person. In contrast, whether based on so-
called necessity or an anthropomorphic theory of the corporation, the
mens rea of the corporation is a fiction.268
3. What About Prosecuting and Reforming Government Agencies?
While the Justice Department has been busy reforming corporate
America, it has not been able to keep its own house in order and has
failed to apply the same stringent standards to government agencies.
In March 2002, at the time the Justice Department was prosecuting
Arthur Andersen, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
which was then still within the Justice Department, had just approved
student visas for two of the deceased September 11th hijackers. 269 An
angry President Bush said that Attorney General John Ashcroft "got
the message" that the INS should "reform as quickly as possible."270
So did the Justice Department have a "compliance program"? Like
other federal agencies, the Department has an Inspector General,
whose duties include auditing financial matters and investigating per-
formance.2 71 It seems that the Department did not have what it would
classify as an "effective" compliance program.
The Justice Department originally opposed the Inspector General
legislation as an unconstitutional infringement of the President's
power.272 Specifically, the Department emphasized the President's
authority to direct the executive branch.273 Since accepting the in-
spector general model the Justice Department has applied it to corpo-
rations. That is to say, the notion that an agency inspector general is
"independent" from the agency and able to report to Congress and
the Justice Department was suggested early in the development of the
organizational guidelines as the model for the compliance programs
266 See supra note 143.
267 See supra note 195.
268 See supra text accompanying note 195.
269 See Laura Sullivan, President Says He's Outraged over INS Letters for Hijackers, BALT.
SUN, Mar. 14, 2002, at 3A.
270 Id.
271 See Inspector General Act of 1978 § 4(a), 5 U.S.C. app. § 4(a) (2000).
272 See Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of




and self-reporting "encouraged" by the guidelines. 2 74 With Sarbanes-
Oxley's "up-the-ladder" reporting requirements, 275 government regu-
lators have pushed corporations much closer to the inspector-general
model, which, the Justice Department once argued, undermines exec-
utive authority.
Although the INS fiasco may not have merited indictment of the
agency, how likely is it that the Justice Department will ever indict a
federal agency? The Department's prosecution guidelines apply to
government entities, 276 and the Department would not have far to
look to find an accounting scandal worth investigating. The D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals ruled in the Indian Trust Fund case that the
U.S. Department of the Interior breached its fiduciary duties in failing
properly to account for monies owed to American Indians over the
course of many years. 277 Given that the Justice Department represents
the Interior Department, it is unlikely that the Justice Department will
indict its own client. Moreover, there has been little embarrassing me-
dia coverage over this scandal to rival coverage of Enron and move the
Justice Department toward a criminal investigation.
CONCLUSION
The federal government insists on compliance standards for cor-
porations but does not hold itself to similar standards. The reporting
obligations imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley on inside and outside counsel,
the demands by the Justice Department and other federal agencies
that corporations waive their privilege against self-incrimination and
self-report criminal violation, and the de facto requirement of codes
of corporate conduct-originally voluntary standards-are being im-
posed on the private sector in the name of reform. These require-
ments reflect the long-discredited view that state-chartered
corporations are quasi-public, not private. Even after Sarbanes-Oxley,
"public corporations" are still state-chartered entities. 278 Making pri-
vate sector corporations more like federal agencies will certainly do
nothing to improve them.
Ironically, the current Republican administration and Congress
have strongly opposed the litigiousness of the large plaintiffs' firms.279
274 See Ronald Goldstock, Making Compliance Credible: The Independent Private Sector In-
spector General (IPSIG) Approach (Sept. 7, 1995), in THE GOOD CITIZEN CORPORATION, supra
note 7, at 221.
275 See Raphaelson et al., supra note 2.
276 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1 n.1.
277 See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1102-04 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
278 See supra note 87 and text accompanying note 141.
279 See Daniel Eisenberg & Maggie Sieger, The Doctor Won't See You Now, TIME, June 9,
2003, at 46, 46 ("President Bush and other Republicans... endorse [tort reform] legisla-
ion, and the House of Representatives has passed a bill along those lines.").
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Besides the large jury awards, they object to the use of litigation as a
means to achieve structural changes in corporate America.280 The
Justice Department likewise objects to the actions of the federal dis-
trict judge in Cobell as an improper exercise in structural change. 28 1
The Justice Department and other federal agencies, however, are pur-
suing just that strategy vis-t-vis corporations. CEOs who worry about
plaintiffs' lawyers should realize that, at worst, plaintiffs will bankrupt
their companies. By contrast, a federal raid can drive down the stock
price of a public company, a federal indictment can bankrupt a com-
pany, and a federal conviction can put the CEO in jail.
280 See Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1101.
281 See id.
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